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ARTICLE
THE STAFFER’S ERROR DOCTRINE
JESSE M. CROSS*
ABSTRACT
Over the last forty years, a new type of legislator has arisen in Congress:
one who, rather than drafting statutes, instead manages a staff bureaucracy that
produces these statutes. By becoming a manager of bills, not a drafter of them,
this new legislator has altered a key relationship in our democracy: that be-
tween members of Congress and the laws they enact. Yet no study has docu-
mented how this modern relationship works—i.e., has chronicled how today’s
federal legislators learn the contents of bills—and thereby shown the modern
relationship between legislator and law. Nor has any study reflected on whether
courts, in light of this altered relationship, need to change the way they interpret
federal statutes.
This Article takes up these tasks. First, it reports the findings of an original
empirical study—one that, through staffer interviews, chronicles the strategies
that members of Congress now use to learn a bill’s contents. Its findings reveal
that, in Congress, legislators’ understanding of a bill typically is based on the
surprisingly brief memoranda and oral briefings they receive from staff. These
sources educate members of Congress on legislative purpose, but they do not
address the smaller details of statutory text, which generally are left to staffers.
In light of these empirical findings, the Article then argues that courts
should adopt a new “staffer’s error doctrine.” Under this doctrine, before a
court applies the plain meaning of a statute, it first confirms that statutory text
does not undermine statutory purpose. In the era of managerial legislators, this
check provides a useful proxy: it protects legislator decisions from staffer er-
rors. In this way, the doctrine takes a neglected principle from the old scriv-
ener’s error doctrine—that courts interpreting statutes should review the work
of unelected legislative staffers for mistakes—and updates it to address modern
congressional realities.
This new doctrine has several merits that the Article highlights. First, it is
compatible with a wide range of interpretive theories—not only intentionalism,
but also at least four prominent varieties of textualism. Second, the doctrine
aligns with—and makes sense of—the Court’s recent direction in statutory in-
terpretation. This merit is reflected in King v. Burwell, the landmark case inter-
preting the Affordable Care Act. In King, the Court essentially (if unwittingly)
performed the exact check required by this new doctrine. In so doing, King
showed that the staffer’s error doctrine is a workable doctrine—and the doc-
trine, in turn, shows that the interpretive approach in King enjoys previously
unnoticed claims to methodological legitimacy.
* Assistant Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law. Yale Law School, J.D.
2011; University of California, Irvine, M.A. 2006. I particularly wish to thank William Es-
kridge, Jr., Abbe Gluck, Bruce Ackerman, John Witt, Nicholas Parrillo, Jack Balkin, Claire
Priest, and all the participants of the 2016 Legislation Roundtable for their helpful and gener-
ous feedback. I also wish to thank my former coworkers at the Office of the Legislative Coun-
sel for the U.S. House of Representatives, as well as the many congressional staffers who
generously contributed interviews to this Article.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last forty years, Congress has undergone a fundamental trans-
formation. Prior to this period, Congress could have been regarded—quite
accurately—as a quaint institution populated only by legislators and a small
cadre of assistants.1 That no longer is true, however. Today, thousands of
legislative staffers populate the halls of Congress—staffers who perform key
legislative tasks. As a result, Congress has been transformed into something
that it did not resemble prior to the 1970s: a large, modern bureaucratic
institution.2
The rise of this bureaucracy has led, among other things, to the emer-
gence of a new type of legislator in Congress. Occupying a position atop an
expansive legislative bureaucracy, this new legislator now spends much of
her time performing a CEO-like task: namely, the task of managing
subordinate staffers.3 This shift by members into a managerial role has fun-
damentally altered the way in which Congress drafts its statutes—yet courts
1 Congressional staffers did not even exist during the first six decades after the ratification
of the Constitution. See HARRISON W. FOX, JR. & SUSAN WEBB HAMMOND, CONGRESSIONAL
STAFFS: AN INVISIBLE FORCE IN AMERICAN LAWMAKING 15 (1977). For a chronicling of the
relatively modest increases in staffing that occurred from the mid-nineteenth century through
the mid-twentieth century, see id. at 20–32; GLADYS M. KAMMERER, THE STAFFING OF THE
COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS 15–23 (1949).
2 On this transformation, see generally Robert H. Salisbury & Kenneth A. Shepsle, U.S.
Congressman as Enterprise, 6 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 559 (1981) (arguing that Congress had
changed to resemble, in its bureaucracy, a modern business enterprise).
3 See, e.g., FOX & HAMMOND, supra note 1, at 143 (“Senators, indeed, are functioning R
more and more like the president or chief operating officer of a corporation, giving direction to
policy and giving staff the responsibility for details.”); Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legis-
lative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 858–59 (1992); Salisbury &
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continue to use interpretive rules and methods that assume that Congress
drafts its statutes the same way it did a century ago.
This Article aims to redress this state of affairs. To accomplish this, it
pursues two specific goals. The first is descriptive: namely, to document the
relationship that exists between members of Congress and modern statutes.
It is a relationship that differs significantly from that which is assumed to
exist in much of the legislation scholarship. Here, the Article observes that,
as a result of the shift by members of Congress into a managerial role, these
members no longer participate in the drafting of statutory text, and they
rarely participate in the pre-enactment review of this text. Instead, the Arti-
cle reveals, their pre-enactment knowledge about the content of bills typi-
cally comes from summaries that outline the purpose of statutory
provisions—summaries provided either via memoranda or in-person staffer
briefings. As such, the staffer-delegation system that prevails in the modern
Congress has produced a situation in which members of Congress, as a rou-
tine matter, provide direct review only of the purpose of statutory provi-
sions—a purpose that they expect congressional staffers to flesh out through
policy development and statutory drafting.
This descriptive portion of the Article draws on the work experience of
the author (who worked for six years as a drafter of congressional statutes),
and it is supported by an original empirical study conducted for this Article.
This study, which consisted of interviews with current and former congres-
sional staffers, documents this modern division of congressional labor—and
it sheds light on its inner workings. In so doing, it reveals certain practices
that might be surprising—practices such as the “one-page rule,” which pro-
vides that bill summaries for some members should not exceed a page in
length, and the “vote rec” strategy, which sometimes restricts bill summa-
ries to a vote recommendation that is written on a single notecard. Through
an examination of these and other practices (and, it should be noted, the
“one-page rule” and the “vote rec” strategy do not operate in a vacuum),
this Article reveals and focuses attention upon a central fact about the mod-
ern Congress: namely, that many modern drafting and briefing practices are
tailored to provide members, in the preponderance of cases, with knowledge
only about the outlines of statutory purpose, thereby entrusting to staffers the
fine details of statutory text.
As the following pages will explain, this internal division of labor is not
merely the result of members of Congress being busy, distracted, or lazy.
Rather, it is a result—at least in part—of the fact that members of Congress
reside at the intersection of two fundamental and conflicting forces. On the
one hand, members are subject to a constitutional mandate that they operate
as generalists. They must represent their constituents with respect to a wide
variety of topics and issues—and the Constitution provides no requirement
Shepsle, supra note 2, at 559 (“[A]s a consequence of staff expansion each member of Con- R
gress has come to operate as the head of an enterprise . . . .”).
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that they bring anything other than a generalist’s knowledge to this position.4
On the other hand, they are expected to produce legislation that reasonably
responds to, and intervenes in, a world of private and governmental institu-
tions that has grown enormously complex. It is a world in which the crafting
of legislation, if it is to be done responsibly, requires domain-specific exper-
tise. In response to this conflicting set of imperatives, members of Congress
have established a system that makes good sense. Under this system, mem-
bers typically approve statements of statutory purpose, and they delegate to
staffers the task of carrying out this purpose via statutory text.
The first goal of this Article, therefore, is to describe this modern draft-
ing reality. The second goal, meanwhile, is to advance an argument about
how courts ought to respond to this new congressional practice. The funda-
mental change in congressional drafting practice that is documented in this
Article gives rise, after all, to an important set of questions in statutory inter-
pretation—questions that the field of legislation largely has failed to con-
front. Indeed, in the relatively rare instances in which legislation scholars
have directed their attention to the increase in delegations to congressional
staffers, they have done so simply in order to consider its implications for
the debate about whether and how courts should use legislative history in
statutory interpretation.5 Yet this new division of labor has implications that
extend well beyond the proper use of legislative history—implications for
our basic understanding of how courts should approach statutory text itself.
Consequently, in addition to documenting this division of labor, this Article
also traces its implications for the ways that courts can, and should, interpret
statutes.
In particular, this Article argues that courts ought to adopt a new doc-
trine—referred to here as the “staffer’s error doctrine”—that acknowledges
and addresses this shift in drafting approaches. The Article finds a template
for this doctrine in the Court’s opinion in King v. Burwell,6 the 2015 case
interpreting a provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.7
In this case, the Court essentially checked to ensure that statutory plain
meaning did not undermine statutory purpose. This particular type of review,
this Article argues, can be viewed as legitimate—and perhaps even neces-
sary—in light of the way in which Congress now divides its labor when
drafting statutes.
In what sense, it might be wondered, does the division of labor in Con-
gress legitimate this interpretive approach? It does so by revealing that the
two relevant elements of the statute—statutory purpose and statutory text—
4 See infra note 137 and accompanying text. R
5 See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 3; James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judi- R
cial Interpretations of Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1, 53–54
(1994).
6 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
7 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (“Affordable Care Act”), 26 U.S.C.
§ 36B (2012 & Supp. V 2017).
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are managed and reviewed by different actors within Congress. In a world in
which statutory purpose is approved by members of Congress and in which
statutory text is drafted by staffers, the review found in King v. Burwell takes
on a new dimension: it operates to ensure that a congressional staffer has not
inserted an error into statutory text that undermines a decision made by
members of Congress.
Once this interpretive method is viewed as a review of the work prod-
uct of unelected staffers, it acquires new claims to legitimacy. In statutory
interpretation, there is a longstanding tradition which holds that courts can
review the drafting work of unelected staffers—a review designed to ensure
that this work has not undermined the decisions made by elected representa-
tives. In fact, there exists a doctrine of statutory interpretation that, although
often misunderstood, is designed to enable courts to perform this exact re-
view: the scrivener’s error doctrine.
As the following pages explain, the scrivener’s error doctrine ostensibly
was designed to police the work of Congress’s internal agents—a policing
function designed to ensure that these agents do not exceed or undermine the
delegation that members of Congress have entrusted to them. As Congress
has delegated an increasing number of lawmaking tasks to staffers in recent
decades, however, the scrivener’s error doctrine has retained the antiquated
assumption that Congress delegates a narrow set of clerical drafting tasks—
and only these tasks—to staffers (or “scriveners”). When courts review stat-
utory text to ensure that it accords with legislative purpose, by contrast, they
actually do check to ensure that the work of today’s staffers accords with the
legislative instructions they were given by elected representatives, thereby
performing this policing function. In this regard, they effectively create an
updated version of this doctrine—a version that this Article refers to as a
“staffer’s error doctrine.” Under this updated doctrine, the principles that
animated the original scrivener’s error doctrine are combined with modern
congressional realities and, through this combination, are made relevant
once again.
By finding this doctrine embedded within the Court’s opinion in King v.
Burwell, this Article reveals that King and the staffer’s error doctrine each
contribute something to the other. On the one hand, King illustrates that the
“staffer’s error doctrine,” as endorsed by this Article, is a workable doctrine.
On the other hand, the doctrine provides new theoretical underpinnings that
can justify the new approach to statutory interpretation that the Court inau-
gurated in King.
In further defense of the doctrine, this Article argues that, regardless of
whether statutory interpreters consider themselves to be intentionalists or
textualists, they should be persuaded that the doctrine is consistent with the
underpinnings of their preferred interpretive methodology. As part of this
defense, this Article observes that the doctrine is compatible with at least
four different variants of textualism.
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Finally, this Article concludes by suggesting that, in light of this Arti-
cle’s findings, it might be useful for the field of legislation to undergo a shift
away from the visions of Congress espoused by textualists and intentional-
ists—a shift instead toward the competing vision of Congress found in the
field of administrative law. In administrative law, it has been widely ac-
cepted that delegation is a fundamental quality of modern lawmaking. In
response to this fact, administrative law has embraced a core principle:
namely, that courts ought to review the work of Executive Branch agents in
order to ensure that those agents have not exceeded the scope of their dele-
gations from Congress. Due to fundamental changes that Congress under-
went in the 1970s and 1980s, this Article explains, delegation to unelected
agents has become a similarly defining feature of lawmaking within Con-
gress. Consequently, federal lawmaking—whether outsourced to agencies or
conducted within Congress—is now marked by delegation. Building upon
this insight, this Article asserts that courts should be reviewing these two
types of lawmaking similarly; in each instance, courts should be ensuring
that agents of Congress did not exceed the scope of their delegations. It is an
interpretive conclusion that is intelligible only when the delegation-based
dimension of the modern Congress is made visible—a dimension that is ob-
scured by the theories of Congress offered by textualists and intentionalists.
This argument is made in five parts. Part II documents the historical
rise—and the present necessity—of a congressional lawmaking process that
this Article describes as the “staffer-delegation model of lawmaking.”
Moreover, it reports the findings of this Article’s empirical study, thereby
chronicling the processes and documents that, in this staffer-delegation
model, are used to educate members of Congress about the contents of bills.
In so doing, Part II draws attention to an important consequence of this
model of lawmaking: the fact that members of Congress no longer provide,
as a routine matter, direct review of statutory text. Part III reviews the
Court’s opinion in King v. Burwell, the case that will provide a template for
the “staffer’s error doctrine,” and it explains how the Court’s ruling takes on
a new dimension when viewed in light of the staffer-delegation model of
lawmaking. Part IV shows that the review performed by the Court in King
revives, albeit accidentally, a type of review that traditionally has been em-
bedded in the scrivener’s error doctrine—a review that courts have failed to
perform effectively, however, as the doctrine has stagnated in the staffer-
delegation era. Part IV additionally shows that, once the Court’s review in
King is seen as a revival of the principles embedded in the scrivener’s error
doctrine, the opinion gains new claims to legitimacy—claims that should
appeal to both intentionalists and textualists. Finally, Part V concludes by
suggesting that, going forward, the field of legislation may benefit from a
shift away from the visions of Congress espoused by textualists and inten-
tionalists—and toward the vision of Congress found in the field of adminis-
trative law.
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II. THE STAFFER-DELEGATION MODEL OF LAWMAKING
For the past several decades, Congress has produced statutes through a
specific process. Under this process, members of Congress delegate signifi-
cant lawmaking tasks to staffers within Congress—and these members,
rather than being involved in the myriad details of policy development and
statutory drafting, instead adopt a managerial role. This role allows members
to provide broad policy guidance and oversight throughout the drafting pro-
cess yet to delegate to staffers (both partisan and nonpartisan) the
subordinate tasks of developing policy details and statutory language.
This Part documents the rise, the inner workings, and the necessity of
this model of lawmaking—referred to here as the “staffer-delegation
model” of lawmaking. In so doing, it highlights the most important conse-
quence of the staffer-delegation model: namely, that most members of Con-
gress are no longer connected, in any direct sense, to statutory text, and
instead are engaging with statutes at the level of legislative purpose.
A. Congress’s Models of Delegation
1. Preceding Delegation Models
Congress has not always relied upon the staffer-delegation model of
lawmaking. As Section 2 explains, this model did not emerge until the post-
New Deal era, and it was not the default method of lawmaking in Congress
until at least the 1970s. This does not mean, however, that members of Con-
gress never delegated lawmaking tasks to subordinate entities prior to the
1970s. Rather, there were two models of delegation that preceded the staffer-
delegation model.
The first of these models was the committee-delegation model. Under
this model, Congress would assign a relatively small number of its members
to a committee, and this group would be responsible for performing a variety
of lawmaking tasks. In the Founding era, for example, the drafting of statu-
tory text often was assigned to ad hoc drafting committees that were com-
prised of members of Congress.8 By the second decade of the 1800s, the
House of Representatives had established standing committees that were ex-
pected, in addition to drafting statutory text, to perform initial policymaking
work on bills.9 The Senate would mimic this turn to standing committees
8
BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE
U.S. CONGRESS 5 (2011) (citing Joseph Cooper & Cheryl D. Young, Bill Introduction in the
Nineteenth Century: A Study of Institutional Change, 1 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 67 (1989)). See gener-
ally Norman K. Risjord, Congress in the Federalist-Republican Era, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE SYSTEM (Joel Silbey ed., 1994). This followed the practice used at
the Constitutional Convention, where the full membership of the Convention debated and ap-
proved constitutional provisions, while a “Committee of Detail” comprised of Convention
delegates drafted and assembled these provisions.
9
SINCLAIR, supra note 8, at 5.
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soon thereafter.10 This reliance upon committees persisted throughout the
nineteenth century and, by 1885, it had increased to the point where Wood-
row Wilson could make his famous statement that “Congress in its commit-
tee-rooms is Congress at work.”11 This reliance would only further increase
during the first half of the twentieth century, to the point where committees
became vital policymaking engines within Congress.12
As the volume and complexity of congressional legislation increased in
the New Deal era, meanwhile, a second model of delegation also emerged:
the agency-delegation model. Since each executive agency employed a large
collection of individuals who were focused upon a single area of legislative
activity, the delegation of lawmaking tasks to these agencies allowed Con-
gress to have its legislation shaped, as James Landis famously phrased it, by
“men bred to the facts.”13 It was an option that Congress increasingly uti-
lized as the demands for complex legislation increased up to, and during, the
New Deal era.
Throughout the New Deal, Congress used at least two different strate-
gies to accomplish this delegation to agencies. First, Congress enacted a va-
riety of statutes that provided agencies with subordinate rulemaking
authority. By the end of the New Deal, this strategy had become fully en-
trenched, and early debates about its constitutionality had largely been set-
tled.14 Second, Congress would delegate the initial drafting of statutes—and,
in some cases, the pre-enactment review of statutes—to executive agencies.
As Nicholas Parrillo has documented, this method of producing statutory
text predominated during the period of 1933 to 1945,15 and it continued to be
utilized to some extent in subsequent decades.
10 Id.
11
WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN AMERICAN POLITICS
79 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1985) (1885).
12 See STEPHEN S. SMITH ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONGRESS 6 (9th ed. 2015) (detailing the
ways in which “[i]n the mid-twentieth century . . . many standing committees and their chair-
men were the dominant players in designing legislation”). Acknowledging that this model
divorced non-committee members from statutory text, Learned Hand observed:
It is of course true that members who vote upon a bill do not all know, probably very
few of them know, what has taken place in committee. . . . [Courts] recognize that
while members deliberately express their personal position upon the general pur-
poses of the legislation, as to the details of its articulation they accept the work of the
committees; so much they delegate because legislation could not go on in any other
way.
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Collier, 76 F.2d 939, 941 (2d Cir. 1935).
13
JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 58 (Greenwood Press 1974) (1938).
14 Since the Court’s “switch in time” in 1936, it has upheld every statute that has come
before it under the nondelegation doctrine. For a discussion of this post-New Deal history of
the doctrine, see, for example, WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., ABBE R. GLUCK & VICTORIA
NOURSE, STATUTES, REGULATION, AND INTERPRETATION 88 (2014) (“No federal statute has
been invalidated by the Supreme Court on nondelegation grounds since the 1930s.”).
15 Nicholas R. Parrillo, Leviathan and Interpretive Revolution: The Administrative State,
the Judiciary, and the Rise of Legislative History, 1890-1950, 123 YALE L.J. 266, 339 (2013).
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Today, however, it can no longer be said that committees or agencies
are the primary drafters of statutory text. Instead, the agency-delegation
model has given way to yet another model of statutory production: the
staffer-delegation model.
2. The Staffer-Delegation Model
i. The Historical Rise of the Model. For much of our nation’s history,
lawmaking was conducted without any significant delegation of lawmaking
duties to staffers. Congressional staffers did not even exist during the first
six decades after the ratification of the Constitution.16 Some staff were hired
during the period from 1840 to the 1920s, but their numbers were few and
their role was marginal.17 By 1924, the committees of Congress collectively
employed a grand total of only 261 committee aides, for example.18
The number of congressional staffers would increase only minimally in
the following two decades.19 Moreover, these pre-1940 congressional staff-
ers performed only clerical functions within Congress.20 Such staffers typi-
cally did not possess the legislative expertise needed to assist Congress in its
lawmaking duties.21 It was estimated that, out of seventy-six committees in
existence at this time, only four had appointed any experts.22 In 1941, there
were “not more than two hundred persons [employed by Congress] who
could be considered legislative professionals.”23 As such, staffers did not
perform duties prior to the mid-1940s that could realistically be character-
ized as lawmaking functions. As one scholar put it, “[u]ntil 1947 the stand-
ing committees did not regularly employ professional staffs. When such staff
16
FOX & HAMMOND, supra note 1, at 15.
17 See id. (describing committees first receiving authorization to hire part-time clerks in
the 1840s, two committees receiving authorization to hire full-time clerks in 1856, and sena-
tors receiving authorization to hire staffers in 1885); id. at 12; see also Printing Reform Act of
1919, Pub. L. No. 65-314, 40 Stat. 1213 (1919) (regularizing employment of member-based
staffers).
18
FOX & HAMMOND, supra note 1, at 15 (“By 1924, 120 committee aides were employed
in the House and 141 in the Senate.”).
19 Id. at 20.
20 Id. at 15; see also id. at 21 (quoting Rep. Ramspeck (D-Ga.) stating that, prior to the
1946 Act, the staff on the Agriculture Committee of the House “ha[d] no special training for
what they [were] doing, they ha[d] no special knowledge of the problems of agriculture, they
[were] merely a clerical staff”).
21 The exception to this was the House and Senate Appropriations Committees and the
Joint Committee on Taxation, which had nonpartisan professional staffs as early as the 1920s.
See CONG. QUARTERLY PRESS, HOW CONGRESS WORKS 190 (5th ed. 2013); see also FOX &
HAMMOND, supra note 1, at 15 (“At the time of the Legislative Reorganization Act in 1946,
committees such as Appropriations had a history of expert, nonpartisan staff—a tradition
which did not extend to most other committees.”).
22
FOX & HAMMOND, supra note 1, at 20 (citing WOL Radio Address by Representative
Mike Maroney, April 1943, in SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE ORGANIZATION OF CON-
GRESS, 79TH CONGRESS, THE ORGANIZATION OF CONGRESS: SYMPOSIUM ON CONGRESS 148
(Comm. Print 1945)).
23
CONG. QUARTERLY PRESS, supra note 21, at 189 (quoting Lindsay Rogers, The Staffing
of Congress, 56 POL. SCI. Q. 1, 1–2 (1991)).
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assistance was needed, it was borrowed on detail from an executive
agency . . . .”24 Moreover, staffers who worked for nonpartisan offices of
Congress similarly were confined to clerical duties during this period.25
The result was a Congress that, through the mid-1940s, was still largely
dependent upon the agency-delegation model of lawmaking. By the 1940s,
however, this dependence began to operate as a source of frustration for
some members of Congress. As Fox and Hammond put it, “[t]here was a
general feeling by 1946 that the executive branch had increased tremen-
dously, and that the imbalance needed to be corrected.”26 This need was
dramatically articulated by Representative Thomas Lane (D-Mass.), for ex-
ample, who would lament that:
As regularly as the clock strikes the hour, and enforced by that
striking, every Member is reminded every day of two facts, as
closely allied as the hands of the clock. The first is that the de-
mands on his time are incessant and even oppressive, and that his
sources of information and assistance inadequate. . . . [The second
is that we] must rely on the very representatives of the Federal
agencies for information when we are trying to exercise our super-
vision of their carrying out of the policy we have prescribed.27
In response to these frustrations, Congress enacted the first of several
statutes that would allow for a steady, decades-long increase in the number
of (and dependence upon) expert congressional staffers: the Legislative Re-
organization Act of 1946.28 This act provided the first authorization for com-
mittees to retain professional staff29—an authorization that soon was
extended to individual Senators as well.30 In the wake of the act’s passage,
the number of congressional staffers—as well as the expertise of these staff-
ers—increased notably.31
24
KAMMERER, supra note 1, at 3.
25 See Jarrod Shobe, Intertemporal Statutory Interpretation and the Evolution of Legisla-
tive Drafting, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 807, 822 (2014) (on Legislative Counsel being limited to
formatting duties); id. at 834 (on Congressional Research Service’s narrow original
responsibilities).
26
FOX & HAMMOND, supra note 1, at 20–21; see also id. at 21 (“The committee staffing
discussion [in Congress] focused on the need for technical competence [and the need for] an
information analysis capability independent of the executive branch . . . .”).
27 See id. at 22 (quoting 92 CONG. REC. H10054 (daily ed. July 25, 1946)).
28 Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 812 (1946).
29
FOX & HAMMOND, supra note 1, at 14 (describing this change and noting that it marked
“a watershed in the area of staffing”); see also KAMMERER, supra note 1, at 4 (similarly
describing this change). Professional aides to representatives would not be recognized until
1970. FOX & HAMMOND, supra note 1, at 12.
30
FOX & HAMMOND, supra note 1, at 12.
31 Id. at 22 (citing KAMMERER, supra note 1, at 34).
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Nonetheless, the 1946 Act was not sufficient, by itself, to cause an im-
mediate shift away from the agency-delegation model of lawmaking.32 In-
stead, Congress would need to pass an additional act: the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1970.33
As Jarrod Shobe has put it, the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970
“paved the way for the modernization of legislative drafting.”34 The act ac-
complished this in a variety of ways. It provided representatives with statu-
tory recognition of their ability, like their counterparts in the Senate, to
retain professional staff.35 It created the modern Congressional Research Ser-
vice, granting the research-focused office autonomy and allowing it to in-
crease significantly in size and clout.36 It expanded the authority of the
House Office of the Legislative Counsel, paving the way for notable in-
creases in the size and capacity of this drafting office (and setting the stage
for a similar expansion of the office’s Senate counterpart).37 And it enabled
changes to the committee system that empowered Congress to hire, retain,
and rely upon committee staffers in the performance of its lawmaking
duties.38
Throughout the 1970s, Congress would pass a series of measures that
would further expand the number of professional staffers working for Con-
gress. The Committee Reform Amendments of 1974 tripled the staffs of
most standing committees of the House of Representatives, including with
respect to professional staff.39 Several other measures were passed in the
1970s that allowed for similar staff increases.40 Meanwhile, the Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974 created the Congressional Budget Office
(“CBO”), an office that would produce important economic analyses for
members—and that eventually would play a central role in the legislative
process.41
As with the 1946 Act, these new measures were part of a coherent, self-
conscious effort in the 1970s to build an internal bureaucracy that would
allow Congress to leave behind the agency-delegation model of statutory
drafting. The scandals of the Nixon administration had given rise to a new
32 See Parrillo, supra note 15, at 338 (citing KAMMERER, supra note 1, at 41–42); Harry
W. Jones, Drafting of Proposed Legislation by Federal Executive Agencies, 35 A.B.A. J. 136,
137 (1949).
33 Pub. L. No. 91-510, 84 Stat. 1140 (1970).
34 Shobe, supra note 25, at 816. R
35 Pub. L. No. 91-510, §§ 301–305, 84 Stat. 1140, 1175–81 (1970; see also FOX & HAM-
MOND, supra note 1, at 24.
36 Pub. L. No. 91-510, § 321; see also Shobe, supra note 25, at 834–43. R
37 See Pub. L. No. 91-510, §§ 501–531; see also Shobe, supra note 25, at 818–23. R
38 Pub. L. No. 91-510, §§ 301–305; see also CONG. QUARTERLY PRESS, supra note 21, at
192.
39 See H.R. Res. 988, 93d Cong. (1974); see also CONG. QUARTERLY PRESS, supra note
21, at 188.
40 For a detailed accounting of these statutes, see CONG. QUARTERLY PRESS, supra note 21,
at 190.
41 2 U.S.C. §§ 601–688 (2012).
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wariness of Executive Branch dependence. In response, Congress undertook
these efforts to increase congressional staffing—efforts that, as one longtime
Beltway journalist has put it, were Congress’s way of “building a bureau-
cracy to fight a bureaucracy.”42
Due to these and other enactments, the number of staffers employed by
Congress increased steadily and significantly in the 1970s and 1980s,
thereby creating the robust congressional bureaucracy that persists today.43
The number of subcommittee staffers employed in the House of Representa-
tives increased by 650 percent during the 1970s, for example.44 Between
1975 and 2011, the number of attorneys employed by the Offices of the
Legislative Counsel tripled; by 2011, these offices together employed more
than eighty attorneys.45 The Congressional Research Service would expand
into a formidable office that employs more than 400 experts and special-
ists.46 The number of committee staffers would more than double between
1965 and 2009, expanding to include over 2200 employees.47 And the num-
ber of personal staffers would nearly double between 1965 and 2009, leap-
ing to over 5800 employees.48
The growth of congressional staffs, it should be noted, has not been
uniform during these periods; staff numbers for many congressional offices
peaked in the mid-1980s, and then subsequently retreated modestly.49 None-
theless, as the comparisons to pre-1980s staffing numbers make clear, these
42 See HEDRICK SMITH, THE POWER GAME: HOW WASHINGTON WORKS 281–82 (quoting
Sen. Moynihan (D-N.Y.) on this motivation); see also id. at 290 (describing CBO as “repre-
senting the most important institutional shift of power on domestic issues between the execu-
tive branch and Congress in several decades” and quoting a domestic policy chief in the Carter
White House on this point).
43 See FOX & HAMMOND, supra note 1, at 13 (“Change has occurred most rapidly in
recent years.”); Salisbury & Shepsle, supra note 2, at 559 (“[I]n the years between 1967 and
1979 the number of congressional committee staff and personal staff employees grew from
7,014 to 13,276; the total number of employees (staffers and others) [by 1981 was] well over
thirty thousand.”).
44
CONG. QUARTERLY PRESS, supra note 21, at 193. The number of Senate subcommittee
staffers increased by only 50 percent during the same period. Id. at 191. S. Res. 60 provided
senators with other ways to access increased professional staffing, however. See S. Res. 60,
93d Cong. (1973).
45
STAFF OF J. COMM. ON PRINTING, 112TH CONG., CONG. DIRECTORY 392–93, 460–61
(Comm. Print 2011); STAFF OF J. COMM. ON PRINTING, 94TH CONG., CONG. DIRECTORY
422–23, 430 (Comm. Print 1975). This statistic and the statistics cited infra notes 46–48 are
also reported in Jarrod Shobe’s recent study of the growth of this staffer bureaucracy. See
Shobe, supra note 25, at 823–45. R
46 Organizational Structure, LIBRARY OF CONG. (Nov. 17, 2017), http://loc.gov/crsinfo/
about/structure.html [https://perma.cc/24QF-6X4W].
47 Vital Statistics on Congress, BROOKINGS INST., ch.5, at 10 tbl5-5 (2017), https://
www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/vitalstats_ch5_full.pdf [https://perma.cc/
7C5Z-RGK5]. On the increase in personal legislative staff of members, albeit during a slightly
earlier period, see FOX & HAMMOND, supra note 1, at 25 (describing the drastic increase in the
number of legislative aides between 1960 and 1975); see also id. at 12 (“Sizable staffs, capa-
ble of sophisticated services, now exist [in 1977] within Member offices and committees.”).
48
CONG. QUARTERLY PRESS, supra note 21, at 195 (citing Vital Statistics, supra note 47). R
49 See KATHY GOLDSCHMIDT, CONG. MGMT. FOUND., STATE OF THE CONGRESS: STAFF
PERSPECTIVES ON INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY IN THE HOUSE AND SENATE 16–19 (2017), http://
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recent staff reductions still have left intact a formidable congressional bu-
reaucracy—one that carries the staffer-delegation model of lawmaking into
the present day.
ii. The Consequences of the Staffer-Delegation Model. As these staffer
offices grew in size after 1970, their employees were able to specialize to a
far greater extent than ever before. In the Congressional Research Service,
for example, the increase in size allowed for the Service to be divided and
subdivided into areas of intensive expertise, with “each attorney working in
just a few legislative areas throughout his or her career,” as one scholar has
put it.50 The Offices of the Legislative Counsel underwent a similar speciali-
zation,51 as did committee staffs.52
With this new specialization, not surprisingly, came a change in the
balance of functions performed by members of Congress, as opposed to
those performed by congressional staffers. No longer were these staffers
simply performing minor clerical tasks. Instead, staffers began to perform
three important lawmaking tasks: policymaking, statutory drafting, and pre-
enactment review of statutory text.
Each of these shifts in responsibility is worth considering further. First,
staffers had begun, by the late 1970s, to assume significant policymaking
responsibilities. This shift was noted in several contemporaneous studies of
Congress. A survey of the literature on congressional staffs from 1981, for
example, observed that: “[I]n many specific situations, [member policy in-
structions to staffers] constitute no more than a general guide to action.”53 In
such instances, the authors observed, members relied upon “the often impor-
tant role of staff in negotiating legislative substance.”54
These trends only continued throughout the 1980s. Speaking in 1986,
Senator William Cohen (R-Me.) could observe that:
[N]o single person can keep up with the sprawling substance of
policy. . . . [A member] will dart into one hearing, get a quick fill-
in from his staffer, inject his ten minutes’ worth and rush on to the
next event, often told by an aide how to vote as he rushes onto the
floor. Only the staff specialist has any continuity with substance.
The member is constantly hopscotching.55
www.congressfoundation.org/storage/documents/CMF_Pubs/cmf-state-of-the-congress.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FKY7-FFC8].
50 Shobe, supra note 25, at 837. R
51 Id. at 822.
52 Id. at 845; see also FOX & HAMMOND, supra note 1, at 144 (“Today [i.e., in 1977] staff
are more expert and are becoming increasingly specialized.”).
53 Salisbury & Shepsle, supra note 2, at 567; see also FOX & HAMMOND, supra note 1, at
143 (describing Senators as “giving direction to policy and giving staff the responsibility for
the details”).
54 Salisbury & Shepsle, supra note 2, at 569. R
55
SMITH, supra note 42, at 292.
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The result of this situation, Cohen added, was that: “You [as a senator]
skate along on the surface of things. More and more you are dependent on
your staff.”56 Consequently, Cohen noted, staffers were routinely making
significant policymaking decisions by the mid-1980s.57
In their efforts to describe this new division of labor within Congress,
scholars in the 1970s and 1980s repeatedly turned to the same analogy:
members of Congress, they observed, now more closely resembled a corpo-
rate CEO than a traditional legislator.58 Rather than make each minor policy
decision for themselves, members would now oversee a set of subordinates
who were empowered to make these decisions. These members shifted into a
supervisory role—a role that allowed them to retain responsibility for re-
viewing larger scale decisions that subordinates believed warranted the at-
tention of their principals.
As part of this larger retreat into a managerial role, members of Con-
gress also increasingly shifted responsibility for statutory drafting to staffers.
Stuart Eizenstat, former domestic policy chief in the Carter White House,
would remark in 1986 that members were routinely delegating statutory
drafting of tax bills to the nonpartisan staffers on the Joint Tax Committee.
As Eizenstat said:
The actual drafting of [tax] legislation, the fine points, the state-
ment of managers, the explanations, the things that can make mil-
lions and millions of dollars of difference have to be done by Joint
Tax because of the complexity and technicality of the tax code. . . .
They’re the only ones who can deal with it. And every tax confer-
ence of necessity leaves significant areas for the Joint Committee
to fill in. Significant areas, involving tens of millions of dollars in
decision.59
Notwithstanding Eizenstat’s observation about the role of the Joint Tax
Committee, however, the offices that would assume nearly sole responsibil-
ity for statutory drafting during these decades were the Offices of the Legis-
lative Counsel. As these offices became larger and more specialized, they
assumed an increasingly large role as the primary drafters of statutory text.
Today, Legislative Counsel drafts nearly every bill that is introduced in Con-
gress. In their recent survey of contemporary congressional drafting prac-
tices, one staffer told Abbe Gluck and Lisa Schultz Bressman that “99% [of
56 Id. at 289–90.
57 See id. (quoting Cohen as saying: “[S]ometimes you’ll call a senator and ask, ‘Why are
you opposing me on this?’ and he’ll say, ‘I didn’t know I was.’ And you’ll say, ‘Well check with
your staff and see.’”).
58 See, e.g., FOX & HAMMOND, supra note 1, at 143 (“Senators, indeed, are functioning
more and more like the president or chief operating officer of a corporation, giving direction to
policy and giving staff the responsibility for the details.”); Salisbury & Shepsle, supra note 2, R
at 559 (“[A]s a consequence of staff expansion each member of Congress has come to operate
as the head of an enterprise.”); Breyer, supra note 3, at 858–59.
59
SMITH, supra note 42, at 279.
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statutory text] is drafted by Legislative Counsel,” and they were told by
another that “[n]o staffer drafts legislative language. Legislative Counsel
drafts everything.”60 Indeed, the Rules Committee of the House frequently
will not even consider amendments to bills unless the members of Congress
have used the services of Legislative Counsel to draft the text of the
amendment.61
As Gluck and Bressman point out, the assumption of drafting responsi-
bilities by Legislative Counsel has a noteworthy implication: it reveals “an
important disconnect . . . between members and statutory text.”62 A 2002
study coauthored by Victoria Nourse—a former counsel to the Senate Judici-
ary Committee—and Jane Schacter uncovered the same disconnect, assert-
ing that: “Most staffers indicated [in a survey] that, as a general rule,
senators themselves did not write the text of legislation.”63 Ganesh
Sitaraman—a former Senior Counsel for Senator Warren64—similarly has
noted in a law review article that: “[S]taff drafts virtually everything; mem-
bers almost never write or edit legislative text.”65 Sitaraman adds:
The overall picture that emerges from understanding the workings
of a congressional office is that [members of Congress] are not
drafters but rather decisionmakers. They are managers of a mini-
bureaucracy who set the direction for policy and sometimes wade
into the details of policy, but who rarely get into the technical
work of legislative drafting.66
Ted Kennedy similarly attested to this disconnect between members and
statutory text in his 2009 memoir. Kennedy stated that: “Ninety-five percent
of the nitty-gritty work of drafting and even negotiating is now done by
staff. That alone marks an enormous shift of responsibility over the past
forty or fifty years.”67 Reflecting on Kennedy’s observation in light of his
journalistic study of the Dodd-Frank bill, Robert Kaiser would add:
In the case of Dodd-Frank, 95 percent might understate staff mem-
bers’ share of the work. . . . [Staffers] were responsible for every
aspect of producing the final legislation: writing provisions (most
60 Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L.
REV. 725, 740 (2014).
61 Amendment Submission Guidelines, H. COMM. ON RULES, DEMOCRATS, http://demo
crats.rules.house.gov/amendment-summary/112th/amendment-submission-guidelines [https://
perma.cc/PF8X-ACDX].
62 Bressman & Gluck, supra note 60.
63 Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congres-
sional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 585 (2002).
64 About Ganesh, GANESH SITARAMAN, https://ganeshsitaraman.com/about-ganesh/
[https://perma.cc/73JW-Y4HB].
65 Ganesh Sitaraman, The Origins of Legislation, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 79, 88 (2015).
66 Id. at 90–91.
67
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, TRUE COMPASS: A MEMOIR 486 (2009).
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based on Obama administration drafts), vetting the contents with
interest groups of all kinds, looking for glitches or omissions, and
hearing out the recommendations and complaints of hundreds of
experts, lobbyists and affected parties.68
As the work by the aforementioned scholars makes clear, the delegation
that occurred with respect to the Dodd-Frank bill was no exception. Rather,
the delegation of statutory drafting to staffers has, today, become a fully
entrenched practice within Congress.
Additionally, the shift to the staffer-delegation model also has meant
that members of Congress typically will not perform a pre-enactment review
of statutory text. As one lobbyist put it when asked if members read most of
the bills: “Most of the bills? [They read] almost none of them! Any member
that was honest will tell you that.”69
Representative Jim Moran (D-Va.) did indeed acknowledge this fact in
an interview about the 2014 National Defense Authorization bill. Moran par-
took in the following exchange:
[Interviewer]: “Have you read all 1,648 pages of the final text of
the National Defense—”
Moran: “Of course not. Are you kidding?”
[Interviewer]: “Are you planning on reading it before you vote?”
Moran: “No.”
[Interviewer]: “How will you know what’s in it?”
Moran: “Because we were, many of these issues we worked
on for years and I trust the leadership . . . .”
[Interviewer]: “Do you think Boehner and Reid have read it?”
Moran: “I know their staff has.”70
These anecdotal statements are supported by a qualitative study con-
ducted in 2013 that found that, in the modern Congress, members of Con-
gress typically do not conduct pre-enactment review of statutory text.71
68 Robert G. Kaiser, Three Reasons Congress Is Broken, WASH. POST (May 23, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-three-reasons-congress-is-broken/2013/05/23/
8b_282d2c-b667-11e2-aa9ea02b765ff0ea_story.html?utm_term=.77c9a80268fb [https://per
ma.cc/BR2V-QRBS]. See ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 20–21 (2014) for a dis-
cussion of Kennedy’s quotation and Kaiser’s additional observation.
69
LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A PLAN
TO STOP IT 126 (2011).
70 Lauretta Brown, Did Rep. Moran Read 1648-Page Defense Bill? “Are You Kidding?”,
CNS NEWS (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/lauretta-brown/did-rep-mo-
ran-read-1648-page-defense-bill-are-you-kidding [https://perma.cc/8KRH-BJA2].
71 Brian Christopher Jones, Don’t Be Silly: Lawmakers “Rarely” Read Legislation and
Oftentimes Don’t Understand It . . . But That’s Okay, 118 PENN STATIM 7, 13–14 (2013), http://
www.pennstatelawreview.org/118/penn%20statim/DontBeSillyFinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5DLF-CG4X].
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When asked if members of Congress read bills, one representative journalist
responded: “Oh . . . absolutely not, no. Not in the United States Congress.”72
Instead, the study found, responsibility for pre-enactment review of
statutory text is conventionally entrusted to staffers. One chief of staff said
that reading legislation was “mostly a staff thing,”73 while a Legislative Di-
rector said it was “predominantly staff’s job” to read all the legislation.74 The
study found journalists familiar with Congress corroborating this finding.75
Summarizing these findings, the study stated that: “[M]embers of Congress
employ specialized staff whose job it is to read and write legislation, and
report to their bosses on particular points of interest.”76 In their survey of
congressional staffers, Gluck and Bressman similarly observed: “Our find-
ings cast doubt on whether members or high-level staff read, much less are
able to decipher, all of the textual details, and illustrate how the different
players in the legislative process contribute to the final product in different
ways, not all of them text focused.”77
This is not to say that members of Congress categorically refuse to read
statutory text. Indeed, members may well supplement bill summaries by pe-
rusing isolated provisions of actual statutory text. However, such reviews—
which are scattershot and de-contextualized—can hardly be considered thor-
oughgoing “readings” of the statutory text.78 Instead, the nature of the pre-
enactment review process—and the sum of materials used by members
therein—suggests that, in essence, most members now provide only an indi-
rect review of the contents of statutes.
In short, a host of scholarly and journalistic studies have documented
the fact that, in the staffer-delegation era, members of Congress have shifted
responsibility for three important tasks to staffers: the tasks of interstitial
policymaking, statutory drafting, and pre-enactment review of statutory text.
Due to this shift in responsibility, these studies reveal, members of Congress
are performing only indirect reviews of the statutes upon which they vote.
This gives rise to questions. What exactly is the nature of this indirect re-
view? What information do members of Congress actually review before
voting on a bill?
iii. The Inner Workings of the Staffer-Delegation Model. In the effort to
understand the nature and sources of information that members of Congress
draw upon to understand bills, interviews were conducted for this Article
with twenty-five congressional staffers. Together, these staffers have worked




76 Id. at 8.
77 Bressman & Gluck, supra note 60, at 742.
78 See, e.g., Christopher Beam, Paper Weight, SLATE (Aug. 20, 2009), http://
www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2009/08/paper_weight.html [https://
perma.cc/EHQ2-G57Z] (describing members “when necessary, poring over the actual text to
understand the more crucial bits”).
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in seventy-five different positions within Congress. Interviewees were drawn
from both parties, both chambers of Congress, and a wide range of commit-
tee and member offices. The interviews were semi-structured in nature;
planned questions were posed to interviewees that, while open-ended, none-
theless would permit for coding by response; and spontaneous follow-up
questions were posed in order to invite interviewees to provide detail and
elaboration on their initial answers. When interviewees answered a question
multiple times to account for the different members for whom they had
worked, their responses were coded as separate answers.
An interview-based study of this sort has several limitations, of course,
a few of which are worth noting at the outset. Such studies always are sub-
ject to possible manipulation by interviewees, who might feel professional
pressure to provide self-serving answers to sensitive questions about the
conduct of their superiors. Moreover, a preference for depth and detail led to
the use of open-ended questions. Due to the time-consuming nature of such
questioning, the number of interviews that feasibly could be conducted was
limited—a tradeoff that prevents the resulting study from operating as a
comprehensive or exhaustive survey of congressional offices.
With these caveats in mind, we can turn to the findings of the study.
First, interviewees were asked: how do members of Congress learn the con-

















Personally draft statutory text
Read bill text
Read memoranda & summary documents
Briefings & conversations
Figure 1. How members learn bill contents.
Several findings captured in Figure 1 warrant discussion. First, no inter-
viewee mentioned direct member involvement in bill drafting. In this way,
the interviews underscored the fact that members no longer participate per-
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sonally in the drafting of statutory text and that, consequently, none learn the
contents of bills through this activity. This highlights the level at which
members are engaging with bills. As one interviewee put it:
[Members are] not sitting there with a pen and writing the legisla-
tion themselves. But they oftentimes think about the concept, at a
very general level. . . . [T]he staffer will get the idea—again, very
broad-based from [the member]—and it’s your job to take that,
run with it, figure out the details.79
Second, the majority of interviewees (nineteen respondents) did not cite
direct review of statutes as a method used by members; a smaller number
(seven respondents) mentioned it as a method used only in exceptional in-
stances; and very few (three respondents) cited it as a consistently used
method. These findings offer several lessons. On the one hand, they counsel
against any categorical assertion that members never read bill text. A partic-
ular member of Congress was mentioned by several interviewees as reading
nearly every bill voted upon, and one committee staffer expressed his belief
that most members on his committee did spend some time with statutory
text. On the other hand, these heavier readers of statutory text appear to be
outliers. One interviewee who worked for a member who read some statu-
tory text, for example, added: “My impression was that was not normal.”80
Another such interviewee estimated that only thirty percent of members look
at statutory text.81 This outlier status is reflected in the aggregate interview
data, where only three out of twenty-five interviewees described review of
bill text as a method consistently used by members.
More commonly, as mentioned above, interviewees either did not list
this method at all (nineteen respondents), or they described it as an excep-
tional practice reserved for abnormal instances (seven respondents). In a typ-
ical response flagging this method as exceptional, for example, one
interviewee said: “Largely it’s a conceptual conversation with occasional
references to sections of legislation.”82 There was no uniform description of
these abnormal instances. Various interviewees mentioned the following as
abnormal instances that increase the likelihood of some statutory text getting
consulted: when a provision addresses a hot-button topic;83 when a provision
addresses an issue on which the member has staked a reputation for high
knowledge or passion;84 when a larger bill is of particular political or social
79 Interview with No. 23, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
80 Interview with No. 22, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
81 Interview with No. 18, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
82 Interview with No. 3, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
83 Interview with No. 4, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 11, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
84 Interview with No. 22, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
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consequence;85 and when a particular member’s vote is undecided and is es-
sential to passage.86
Two interviewees also mentioned a practice that may effectively pre-
vent “off-committee” members from learning bill contents by reading the
bill. Sometimes, they asserted, a committee will not share the actual bill text
with member offices until shortly before the bill text is posted publicly.87
This practice exists, interviewees said, due to concern that member offices
might, intentionally or unintentionally, leak the bill text before the commit-
tee hopes to release it publicly. While bill text must be posted forty-eight
hours in advance of action on the bill, it often has been lamented that this
provides insufficient time for outside actors to read a bill comprehensively.
Based on these interviewees’ remarks, some member offices may labor
under similar constraints (though they may not mind this, as explained
below).
In short, while it is an overstatement to say that members categorically
refuse to read statutory text, interviews made clear that it is not prevailing
practice for members to learn bill contents by reading the bill.
Instead, Figure 1 outlines a world in which members of Congress now
rely overwhelmingly on two sources for their information about bills: (1)
memoranda and summary documents; and (2) briefings and conversations.
Twenty-five interviewees reported that memoranda (and other summary doc-
uments) were used exclusively or routinely by members for this purpose,
and twenty-five interviewees similarly reported that briefings (and other in-
person conversations) were used exclusively or routinely by members for
this purpose. When it comes to how members learn bill contents, as one
interviewee put it: “Conversations and memos are usually [the strategy].”88
To shed light on the nature of these information sources, interviewees
were asked a number of questions about them. With respect to memoranda
and summary documents, interviewees first were asked about the type of
summary documents used. In response, they mentioned a number of differ-
ent documents that might be provided to the member, but the most com-
monly reported document—by a wide margin—was a staffer-generated
memorandum. In the words of a typical respondent: “Almost every personal
office that I have worked in or worked with, the [legislative] staff do vote
memos for members.”89 Another remarked: “Whenever we do a bill intro-
duction, we do a memo to [our member] outlining the parameters of [it,
which would say]: ‘This is what the bill would do, this is our idea, this is the
general concept.’” 90
85 Interview with No. 20, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
86 Interview with No. 8, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
87 Id.; interview with No. 8, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 12, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
88 Interview with No. 10, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
89 Interview with No. 21, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
90 Interview with No. 23, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
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Asked to compare the level of detail in these documents to that found in











Level of summary document detail
Less detailed Less or equally detailed
Equally detailed Equally or more detailed
More detailed Too varied for general description
Figure 2. Summary documents, compared to section-by-section.
Section-by-section breakdowns in committee reports, it must be recal-
led, are themselves relatively concise. Yet, as the above chart shows, inter-
viewees were unambiguous: memoranda and other summary documents are
more brief and purpose-oriented than even a section-by-section. As inter-
viewees put it:
• “[Summary documents are] much more of an overview than a
section-by-section. Pithiness is valued very much on the Hill.”91
• “You’re distilling a 60-page bill into 500 words, or 300 words—
very top-level.”92
• “We send information upwards—at my level, it’s X amount of
information, and then what I give to the staff director is X minus
two, because you need to simplify it, because they have less
time. And then they take that, and it’s like X minus six for the
staff director’s staff director, and then it’s even less when it gets
to the member. It then ends up being talking points.”93
• “Less is generally more.”94
91 Interview with No. 9, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
92 Interview with No. 16, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
93 Interview with No. 18, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
94 Interview with No. 15, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\56-1\HLL101.txt unknown Seq: 22  1-MAR-19 11:03
104 Harvard Journal on Legislation [Vol. 56
• “Most members, everything they get is a very, very concen-
trated look at what the issue is.”95
• “[We] had a top-level document that kind of said, ‘Okay, we
fixed [the issue]!’ Which is really what [members] cared about.
‘And here are the offsets [i.e., spending reduction policies that
offset the bill’s costs].’ That’s what they want to know.”96
• “In terms of the detail, it will not necessarily be a section-by-
section—I think that’s really information that, in the agent-prin-
cipal relationship, your [member] is deferring to you to know
the details in the weeds. It’s usually bigger picture. . . . So a
memo would generally set out, very briefly, ‘Here is the con-
tents of what’s in the bill, here are the [members] that support
the bill, here are the groups that support the bill and oppose the
bill, here is the pathway to passage . . . and here is your staff
recommendation and why.’” 97
• “If you go to congress.gov, the summary page on each of the
bills—that’s how much information [about 70% of the mem-
bers] will take.”98
The brevity of these memoranda was underscored by a noteworthy con-
gressional practice that was mentioned by seven different interviewees: an
informal expectation that memoranda should not exceed one page in length.
One interviewee referred to this as the “one-page rule.” In the words of
interviewees:
• “Some members would like to see all the information and read
everything, [but] most members want no more than one page
on any given issue, on any given bill.”99
• “If I can’t fit an entire ‘rec’ [i.e., vote recommendation] on one
page, then I’m not doing my job well enough.”100
• “I would say that, for the most part, they don’t know what’s in
the contents of the bill. They certainly know what’s in a one-
pager, and a summary. I don’t know if I would go as far as to
say that they know what’s in a section-by-section of the bill. . . .
That’s the vast majority of members.”101
• “Any time you go past one page, then you need a reason for it.
Your typical vote memo for a non-controversial bill is probably
a page. For a bill you think your boss is interested in, [it] might
be two. I would consider a four-page memo to be a super-long
95 Interview with No. 18, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
96 Interview with No. 19, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
97 Interview with No. 23, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
98 Interview with No. 18, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
99 Interview with No. 9, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
100 Interview with No. 11, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
101 Interview with No. 17, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
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memo that I would only send to a substantive member that was
really interested.”102
• “The unwritten rule is, you really want to give [your member]
one page. . . . If you’re voting on an amendment on the floor, it
could be very much shorter than that. It may literally be a para-
graph of three to four sentences. ‘Here is your staff’s recommen-
dation, here’s why.’” 103
Four additional interviewees mentioned that memoranda for members
should not exceed two pages.104 In the words of one such interviewee:
“[Typically,] it’s been literally two pages or less. If you’re feeling really
special today, maybe you can go into a third.”105 There was some additional
variation in the responses on memorandum length; one interviewee claimed
to insist upon writing five-to-eight-page memoranda,106 and another men-
tioned that, while some members would not read past the first page, others
would read a five-page memorandum.107 Even these outlier reports, however,
describe documents that, when compared to the length of many federal bills,
are very brief. And, overall, the interviews supported the contention of one
interviewee that “some members would like to see all the information and
read everything, [but] most members want no more than one page on any
given issue, on any given bill, so that they are able to understand the gravity
of their vote.”108
A few other summary documents warrant comment. One—already
mentioned above—is the “vote rec,” which provides a member with a brief
summary of a bill and a staff recommendation on how to vote. A “vote rec”
for the floor of Congress often is limited to a notecard or sheet of informa-
tion. For some members, this notecard presumably serves merely as a re-
minder of the bills to be voted upon. Yet staffers also describe these
notecards as regularly constituting the entirety of the information that mem-
bers will consume on bills, saying:
• “When members go down to vote every day, they get a card
which is two-and-a-half inches by six, or seven. And it has the
recommendations for why they should vote yes or no on every
bill that’s going to be on the floor. And the blurb is—imagine
that small of a notecard, and that’s how much [roughly seventy
percent of members] will usually know. Unless they care about
102 Interview with No. 21, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
103 Interview with No. 23, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
104 Interview with No. 5, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 6, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 24, Cong. Staffer, in Columbia, S.C.; Interview
with No. 25, Cong. Staffer, in Columbia, S.C.
105 Interview with No. 6, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
106 Interview with No. 14, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
107 Interview with No. 21, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
108 Interview with No. 9, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\56-1\HLL101.txt unknown Seq: 24  1-MAR-19 11:03
106 Harvard Journal on Legislation [Vol. 56
it, where they’ll pull a staffer and take them with them and walk
and talk on the way to the floor.”109
• “[A member’s staff] will write up a ‘vote rec.’ So, personal of-
fice staffers . . . will write up a vote recommendation, like,
‘Lean yes. Yes. Lean no. No.’ And why—a paragraph why. And
so most members, you’ll see them walk on the floor with a card,
you know, this big [gestures the size of a notecard], that has
their vote recs on it. A lot of them don’t know what they’re vot-
ing on. You’re on the floor, they’re like, ‘what am I voting on
right now?’”110
Several interviewees also mentioned “dear colleague” letters as an edu-
cational tool, which are letters written in the voice of one member explaining
the bill’s goals to another. Other interviewees mentioned a “charge-and-re-
sponse,” which outlines the opposing party’s likely criticisms of a bill and
provides retorts to those criticisms. Others mentioned the fact sheet about
the bill that the Leader’s office typically generates. All of these documents
were described as similarly concise and overview-oriented in nature, with
interviewees saying:
• “Generally a ‘dear colleague’ is broad . . . you might have a bill
that’s pretty long—100 pages plus—and you still have a single-
page ‘dear colleague.’” 111
• “[In a charge and response,] if you’re defending against a re-
sponse for three or four pages, methinks you do protest too
much.”112
• “The leadership [fact sheet] is usually much more message fo-
cused [i.e., focused on political rhetoric and ‘spin’] than ours is,
and it usually ends up being longer. . . . I think their press staff
do it. . . . So it’s more of a communications document.”113
The brevity of these documents can seem disconcerting, but the docu-
ments do not exist in a vacuum. Only four interviewees described summary
documents as the exclusive material used by members. Rather, most inter-
viewees described a process whereby memoranda and staff-generated sum-
mary documents worked in tandem with: (1) additional summary documents
(though of a similar overview nature) such as analyses from stakeholders,
newspaper articles, Bloomberg and Congressional Quarterly summaries, and
whip notices; and (2) in-person briefings of, and conversations with, mem-
bers on the contents of bills. These briefings and conversations were de-
scribed as taking various forms, such as:
109 Interview with No. 18, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
110 Interview with No. 12, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
111 Interview with No. 21, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
112 Interview with No. 13, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
113 Interview with No. 21, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
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• Member-to-member conversations.
• Member legislative staff briefing the member.
• Committee staff briefing individual members.
• Committee staff briefing caucuses.
• Committee staff briefing member staffers (who then brief
members).
• Whip sessions and other whip briefings to staff and members.
What, then, is the nature of these briefings and conversations? Asked













Nature of briefing or conversation
Conceptual Varies Text-focused
Figure 3. Briefing and conversations: conceptual or text focused?
As Figure 3 reflects, interviewees were unambiguous that briefings and
conversations are more conceptual in nature. Elaborating, interviewees
remarked:
• “I think the majority of members—I would say eighty-five per-
cent of members—it’s going to be a conceptual conversation.
Like, you’re going to say, ‘Here’s what the bill does.’ You would
never go through the statute with them or say, ‘Here, in [the
text of this specific section of existing law].’ . . . [W]hat they
do is say, ‘Take me through section by section. What does this
do.’ And you walk through. But you’re not going to take out
your statute and say, ‘Here’s where it goes.’” 114
114 Interview with No. 6, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
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• “Largely, it’s a conceptual conversation with occasional refer-
ences to sections of legislation.”115
• “Oh, [it is] conceptual for sure.”116
• “It’s not text-based. It’s much more conceptual than that. It’s a
high-level discussion. There are individual folks who may want
to get more engaged and may want to get more into the weeds,
but generally speaking, at these staff director or LD [i.e., legis-
lative director] briefings, or member-level briefings, they tend
to be ten-thousand foot. . . . All overview stuff.”117
• “[You do it] conversationally. ‘This is the problem. This is
what we’re trying to do to address it. This is generally how we’re
addressing it.’ But you make it conversational.”118
• “Our conversations tend to be very akin to a law clerk-judge
relationship, where you’re talking very broadly about the con-
cept, and then you’re delegated the responsibility to implement
that—to fill it in, fill in the weeds and the details. If specific
issues come up that could be problematic in the weeds, you may
revisit and talk to [the member] about it. But for the most part,
once you’re given the marching orders, you pretty much
execute.”119
• “Usually it’s at a high level, so usually it’s more of a policy
question [that is discussed], and the policy strengths and weak-
nesses. . . . Who will be impacted, what will be the limitations,
how broad will the scope be, how does this reconcile with what
I have supported or voted on in the past.”120
Just as the brevity of congressional memoranda underscored their gen-
eral, purpose-focused nature, the time constraints for member briefings em-
phasize the same quality. Interviewees remarked:
• “You’re not going to take out your statute and say, ‘Here’s
where it goes.’ Because you don’t get that much time with them.
You get, if you’re really lucky, 30 minutes, on a pretty deep
topic. It’s really rare that you would get more than that with
them. And that’s going to be interrupted. . . . You’ve got to speak
fast and speak concisely.”121
• “You get two minutes up front to make your pitch, and then
they ask questions.”122
115 Interview with No. 3, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
116 Interview with No. 6, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
117 Interview with No. 7, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
118 Interview with No. 13, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
119 Interview with No. 23, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
120 Id.
121 Interview with No. 6, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
122 Interview with No. 21, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
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• “[The member] would look at [the summary documents and
text] overnight, send back comments and say, ‘Let me meet
with them for fifteen minutes today. The vote’s tomorrow.’” 123
• “You may have a bill that you’ve worked on for three months,
and you may have anywhere from five to fifteen minutes to talk
to the [member] about everything they need to know. So . . .
you don’t have to communicate the whole fact pattern—but it’s
knowing, what are the major issues, what is it that the [mem-
ber] needs to know, and making sure they know that.”124
• “[Conversations are] anywhere from as short as thirty seconds
to as long as maybe forty-five minutes to an hour, depending on
what’s at stake, depending on how weighty the issue is, how
technical it could be.”125
The discovery of these time constraints reinforces the central finding
about briefings: namely, that they provide members with a big-picture, pur-
pose-level overview, not with all the fine details embedded in statutory text.
In aggregate, interviewees therefore depicted a staffer-delegation model
that relies largely on memoranda and briefings to educate members on the
contents of bills—materials that were depicted as conceptual and concise.
As a result, they depicted a system in which members of Congress typically
are engaging with bills at the level of statutory purpose. As interviewees put
it:
• “For the most part, my observation is [that members] don’t re-
ally care about the details of an individual bill. They would con-
sider themselves more big-picture thinker[s], not really
concerned with the details. The staff will handle that.”126
• “Most members do not want to understand the intricacies of [an
in-the-weeds reform]. They want to know how it’s going to af-
fect their [district]. So, you can say, ‘Here’s what we’ve done,
generally speaking, and here’s how it’s going to affect X, Y, and
Z.’ [That] is what they’re really concerned about, not the techni-
cal [issues, such as], ‘And then, we inserted a subclause
(I)!’” 127
• “I think it’s safe to say that senators and representatives are gen-
eralists and they’re conceptualists. They’re big-picture people,
and they hire staff to fill in the weeds and to know the details—
and to be able to communicate with them what those details are,
and to tell them what’s important.”128
123 Interview with No. 22, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
124 Interview with No. 23, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
125 Id.
126 Interview with No. 17, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
127 Interview with No. 19, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
128 Interview with No. 23, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
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This information about members of Congress comes with a caveat men-
tioned by nearly every interviewee: that the internal operations of congres-
sional offices can vary significantly, based on the member. Office
practices—including with respect to legislative activities—are designed to
accommodate the preferences, interests, and learning styles of the elected
representative. Consequently, there is no uniform rule about how members
learn the contents of bills. Yet this diversity only makes the trends discov-
ered in this empirical study all the more interesting—and they paint an un-
ambiguous picture of members relying primarily on briefings and
memoranda to engage with bills at the level of statutory purpose.
B. The Necessity of Delegation
The rise within Congress of the staffer-delegation model of lawmaking
begs an important question: Why have members of Congress, for several
decades, consistently delegated certain lawmaking tasks to others? Why
have they not simply performed these tasks themselves?
Commentators have offered one possible answer to this question. Most
often, these commentators suggest, delegation within Congress is due to the
fact that members of Congress are busy individuals. In his concurrence to
Bank One Chi. v. Midwest Bank & Trust,129 for example, Justice Stevens
stated that delegation to committees was necessary because: “Legislators,
like other busy people, often depend on the judgment of trusted colleagues
when discharging their official responsibilities.”130 More recently, Judge
Katzmann has made the same point, stating “the expanding, competing de-
mands on legislators’ time reduce opportunities for reflection and delibera-
tion. In that circumstance . . . members operate in a system in which they
rely on the work of colleagues [to discover] what the proposed legislation
means.”131 As John Manning has observed, these arguments by Justice Ste-
vens and Judge Katzmann are typical. They assume that congressional dele-
gation both is occurring and is permissible because, as Manning put it: “A
busy Congress must have the ability to paint with a broad brush and leave
the detail work to the committees and sponsors who take the lead in framing
solutions to a perceived social problem.”132
This assumption—namely, that members of Congress delegate lawmak-
ing tasks simply because they are busy people—has a noteworthy conse-
quence. It suggests to courts that, while this delegation may indeed be
occurring, it is not a fact that courts should take into account when interpret-
ing statutes. The assumption has this effect for two reasons. First, the “busy
129 516 U.S. 264, 276 (1996) (Stevens, J., concurring).
130 Id.
131
KATZMANN, supra note 68, at 17–18.
132 John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673,
693 (2001); see also Jones, supra note 71, at 9 (suggesting that members do not read statutory
text because “[l]awmakers are extremely busy individuals”).
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Congress” hypothesis suggests that Congress’s use of the staffer-delegation
model is the result of workflow patterns in Congress that are variable, uncer-
tain, and difficult to verify. After all, how busy are members of Congress,
really? And do they really need to be this busy? It is difficult to measure
this—and even more difficult to predict it for the future. As such, delegation
to staffers does not appear to be a solid, unwavering, documentable fact
about congressional practice—i.e., the sort of fact that courts want to rely
upon when making assumptions about the lawmaking process.
Indeed, in his efforts to discourage legislative history usage by courts,
Justice Scalia gave voice to this precise concern. As Scalia put it:
The only plausible justification for giving effect to legislative his-
tory is that the legislature is far too busy to consider the minute
details of the bills that it considers—that it expects, it wishes, them
to be resolved by the members and committees that draft the legis-
lation and bring it to the floor. We have no idea whether this as-
sessment of legislative expectations and desires is correct; there
are forceful assertions of congressional sentiment to the
contrary.133
When delegation is understood simply to be the result of a busy Congress,
then this delegation frequently will appear to judges as it appears to Justice
Scalia: as too variable and uncertain to warrant judicial recognition.
Moreover, there is a second reason why the “busy Congress” hypothe-
sis might make courts hesitant to acknowledge the omnipresence of staffer
delegations: the hypothesis makes these delegations appear to be the product
of choice rather than of necessity. If someone is “too busy” to do something,
then that fact seemingly reflects the person’s priorities as much as the per-
son’s workload. When delegation is viewed as the result of members being
too busy to craft statutes themselves, therefore, it paints a troubling picture
of Congress. The drafting, reviewing, and passing of statutes are, after all,
the core professional responsibilities of members of Congress. If members of
Congress believe that they are too busy to engage in these lawmaking activi-
ties, the thinking goes, then perhaps they should simply clear more time on
their schedules for this activity.134 And the last thing that courts should do is
enable this irresponsible congressional behavior—yet this is precisely what
courts would be doing, it seems, by acknowledging these delegations.135 In
this sense, a theory that grounds congressional delegation in the “busy Con-
gress” hypothesis dissuades courts from acknowledging these delegations
133
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LE-
GAL TEXTS 384 (2012).
134 For a scholar making these claims, see Hanah Metchis Volokh, A Read-the-Bill Rule
for Congress, 76 MO. L. REV. 135, 140–41 (2011).
135 See id. at 152 (criticizing instances where a “court decides to facilitate that improper
behavior” of legislators not reading bills).
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for a second reason: it seems to incentivize bad behavior by members of
Congress.
How accurate is the “busy Congress” hypothesis, however? The an-
swer to this question is somewhat complex. On the one hand, there undoubt-
edly is some truth to the hypothesis, as members of Congress now have an
incredible number of demands on their time. At the same time, however, this
hypothesis is notably incomplete. The routine delegation of lawmaking tasks
to staffers is not simply the result of members of Congress being busy.
Rather, this delegation also is a result, at least in part, of the fact that mem-
bers of Congress now unavoidably exist at the intersection of two conflicting
realities: a Constitution that envisions generalist legislators, on the one hand,
and a complex modern world that requires specialized, expert governance,
on the other hand.136
Consider each of these conflicting elements in greater detail. On the
one hand, the Constitution mandates that members of Congress be general-
ists. The Constitution makes no effort to divide the legislative power and
assign it to individuals who have in-depth knowledge or expertise in subject-
matter areas. In fact, the Constitution actively prevents such a division; it
does not permit the citizens of a state to elect a senator of military affairs, a
senator of health care, a senator of agriculture, and so on. Instead, it man-
dates that electors choose individuals to represent them—and to make legis-
lative decisions—with respect to the full range of legislative issues that will
arise in the federal government.137
On the other hand, members of Congress find themselves in the posi-
tion of regulating modern institutions, actors, and forces that are incredibly
sophisticated and complex. Today, this complexity takes the form of at least
three distinct challenges. First, members face the challenge posed by real-
world complexity. The complexity encountered on this front has increased
136 In some senses, the concern about this tension is as old as the Founders. See, e.g., THE
FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 379 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961).  (“It is not possible
that an assembly of men called for the most part from pursuits of a private nature continued in
appointment for a short time and led by no permanent motive to devote the intervals of public
occupation to a study of the laws, the affairs, and the comprehensive interests of their country,
should, if left wholly to themselves, escape a variety of important errors in the exercise of their
legislative trust.”) This was a concern, Publius elsewhere noted, because: “No man can be a
competent legislator who does not [possess] . . . a certain degree of knowledge of the subjects
on which he is to legislate.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 53, at 332 (James Madison) (Clinton Ros-
siter, ed., 1961).
Nonetheless, Publius was not envisioning a world in which legislators would need to pos-
sess a level of expertise anywhere near the level required today. This fact is highlighted by
Publius’s proposed solution to this problem: multi-year terms in the House and Senate. See id.
(explaining that two-year terms in the House afforded the “actual experience” necessary to
become, and to function as, a “competent legislator” on federal matters); THE FEDERALIST NO.
62, at 374 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“Another defect to be supplied [that
is, remedied] by a senate lies in a want of due acquaintance with the objects and principles of
legislation.”).
137
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 1 (vesting “All legislative Powers” in members of Congress,
rather than dividing these powers among different individuals based upon subject matter).
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significantly since the dawn of the twentieth century. Specialization during
this period meant that many regulated industries and institutions became in-
ternally more complex—a fact which makes it more challenging to intervene
in these industries in a precise, effective, and minimally disruptive fashion.
Moreover, these specialized institutions have provided access to increasingly
sophisticated knowledge of the surrounding world—knowledge that, once
available, legislators were expected to draw upon in the production of
legislation.
Environmental legislation provides a good example. This legislation no
longer is motivated by traditional, generalist-accessible concerns about nui-
sances. Instead, the Clean Air Act outlines a regulatory regime relating to
ozone pollutants that creates tiers based on the concentration of such pollu-
tion in micrograms per cubic meter;138 that weighs treatment of CO com-
pounds as opposed to volatile organic compounds;139 and that outlines the
balance of benzene, aromatics, and oxygen that may be included in reformu-
lated gasoline.140 Here, twentieth-century specialization has led to fields of
knowledge that, even as they motivated legislation, also rendered that legis-
lation accessible only to a relatively small field of experts.
Generalist legislators have little way of knowing, at the outset, whether
such complexities lurk with respect to any given bill or legislative project. A
bill that uses seemingly simple terms frequently will belie a thicket of con-
cerns. To take one example: the real-world complexities of the health care
industry have led the seemingly straightforward term “hospital” to have dif-
ferent, highly-technical meanings in different areas of federal law (indeed,
even within different parts of the Medicare statute).141 When complexities so
frequently lurk beneath seemingly straightforward language, responsible leg-
islation essentially requires reliance upon a system of consistent delegation.
Moreover, the modern Congress also must navigate a second challenge
that necessitates expertise: the challenge of statutory complexity. Many fed-
eral statutory regimes are now both incredibly large and impenetrably dense.
First, consider their size: by the early 1980s, to take one example, the federal
criminal code was already estimated to address more than 3000 distinct
crimes.142 The Social Security Act, which was thirty-five pages in length
when first enacted, now contains an individual title that is itself over 1000
pages in length.143 The tax code, meanwhile, is now roughly 2600 pages in
138 Clean Air Act of 1963 § 163(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7473 (2012).
139 See, e.g., id. § 187(b)(2).
140 See id. § 211(k).
141 See Social Security Amendments of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(e) (2012) (outlining nu-
merous exceptions to the internal definition of the word “hospital”).
142 See Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, Many Failed Efforts to Count Nation’s Federal
Criminal Laws, WALL ST. J. (July 23, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405
2702304319804576389601079728920 [https://perma.cc/H7ZN-BVJC].
143 See Social Security Act § 5 et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1395 et seq. (2012).
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length.144 While these statistics are not necessarily good proxies for the com-
plexity of the underlying laws, they nonetheless illustrate the vastness of the
existing statutory regime.
In addition, these statutes often are dense with formulas and defined
terms that ripple throughout the statute in far-flung and hard-to-perceive
ways.145 Consider again the example of the Medicare statute. Here, the term
“star rating system” that appears in Part C of the statute has no formal defi-
nition, but it implicitly imports a definition previously developed by the
agency to administer Part D of the statute.146 Meanwhile, the formula for
physician payments in Part B of the statute scaffolds upon prior payment
formulas located elsewhere in the statute (but not cross-referenced),147 and it
makes no mention of a multiplier that appears much later in the statute
(which, in some years, can vary the payment amount by as much as eighteen
percent).148 Describing the resulting statute, the Fourth Circuit once ob-
served: “There can be no doubt but that the statutes and provisions in ques-
tion, involving the financing of Medicare and Medicaid, are among the most
completely impenetrable texts within human experience.”149
Due to statutory complexity of this sort, the Legislative Counsel for the
Senate would remark, even decades ago, that it took two or three years of
on-the-job training in order for an individual to become a competent drafter
even with respect to a single subject-matter area of federal legislation.150 In
the equivalent drafting office for the House of Representatives, conventional
wisdom now holds that it takes closer to six years to reach this level of
competence. The notion that a generalist legislator elected for a six-year
term (or, in the House, for a two-year term) could navigate this statutory
landscape in any competent way for herself, rather than by delegating the
task, is farfetched.
144 Andrew L. Grossman, Is the Tax Code Really 70,000 Pages in Length?, SLATE (Apr.
14, 2014, 11:56 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2014/04/how_
long_is_the_tax_code_it_is_far_shorter_than_70_000_pages.html [https://perma.cc/6SSK-
SBFT].
145 On the complexity of modern statutes, see Victoria McGrane, Read the Bill? It Might
Not Help, POLITICO (Sept. 8, 2009, 4:24 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2009/09/read-
the-bill-it-might-not-help-026846 [https://perma.cc/QC4D-D87B] (quoting political scientist
Ross Baker as saying: “These bills are not written for even the educated layperson. They are
written for specialists.”).
146 Social Security Act § 1853(o)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-23 (2012).
147 See id. § 1848(d)(1)(B).
148 See id. § 1848(b)(1) (outlining certain components of the formula for physician pay-
ments); id. § 1848(q)(6)(E) (describing an additional merit-based incentive payment system,
which increases or decreases Medicare payments by up to nine percent a year).
149 Rehab. Ass’n of Va., Inc. v. Kozlowski, 42 F.3d 1444, 1450 (4th Cir. 1994).
150 A Concurrent Resolution Establishing a Joint Committee on the Organization of Con-
gress S. Con. Res. 2 Before the J. Comm. on the Org. of the Cong., 89th Cong. 1182 (1965)
(statement of John H. Simms, Senate Legislative Counsel) (“Because of the specialized nature
of the work, a new member of the staff is of little value to the office until he has served in it
for 2 or 3 years . . . .”).
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Moreover, a third challenge awaits any member of Congress who is
drafting legislation: the challenge of agency-implementation complexity. To-
day, executive agencies are massive, sophisticated institutional operations.
The Department of Defense, which technically has over 3.2 million employ-
ees, is reported to be the largest employer in the world.151 The Department of
Transportation—perhaps a more representative agency—still has over
56,000 employees and a budget of over $70 billion.152 The Department of
Health and Human Services processes over a billion claims for Medicare
payment each year, and it provides Medicare coverage to more than 50 mil-
lion persons through annual expenditures of more than $600 billion.153 These
are large institutions—and the quantity of their output befits their size. In
2013, agencies collectively published over 75,000 pages of material in the
Federal Register154—a number which includes the publication of anywhere
between 2500 and 4500 rules per year.155 Agencies, in short, are massive
bureaucratic undertakings. Legislation that is not attentive to their volumi-
nous products and to their complex internal processes can result in signifi-
cant and costly disruptions to ongoing implementation operations. A policy
that appears wise out of context often appears quite different when viewed in
light of agency-level realities, and policies that are uninformed by the minu-
tiae of agency-implementation realities can quickly go astray.
These three challenges—posed by real-world complexity, statutory
complexity, and agency-implementation complexity—confront any modern
legislator who attempts to draft responsible legislation. The result is a mod-
ern drafting landscape that fundamentally differs from the comparatively
simple drafting scenarios envisioned in many legislation classrooms.156 In
this complex modern landscape, it is difficult to imagine any option that a
legislator has other than to delegate extensive policymaking and drafting
decisions to agents. In these situations, direct member involvement leads
only to frustrations of the sort articulated by Representative John Conyers
(D-Mich.), who asked: “What good is reading the bill if it’s a thousand pages
151 Ruth Alexander, Which Is the World’s Biggest Employer?, BBC NEWS (Mar. 20, 2012),
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-17429786 [https://perma.cc/DWA3-NSTQ].
152
DAVID RANDALL PETERMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44062, DEPARTMENT OF









MAEVE P. CAREY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43056, COUNTING REGULATIONS: AN
OVERVIEW OF RULEMAKING, TYPES OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS, AND PAGES IN THE Federal
Register 17 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43056.pdf [https://perma.cc/S22G-BPSY].
155 Id. at 2.
156 H. L. A. Hart’s famous “No vehicles in the park” scenario provides a notable example.
See H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593,
607 (1958).
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and you don’t have two days and two lawyers to find out what it means after
you read the bill?”157
In these situations, in short, delegation of lawmaking is not merely a
byproduct of legislators having busy schedules. It is a necessary adaptation
to the complexity of modern lawmaking.
The legal community has long acknowledged that Congress’s use of its
prior model of delegation—the agency-delegation model of lawmaking—
was a necessary response to the complexity of lawmaking in the modern
era.158 Indeed, the Court has repeatedly concurred in this assessment.159 As
the Court put it in Mistretta v. United States160:
[O]ur jurisprudence [regarding rulemaking delegations to agen-
cies] has been driven by a practical understanding that in our in-
creasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more
technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an
ability to delegate power under broad general directives.161
In the context of agency delegations, therefore, it has been acknowl-
edged that the complexity of modern lawmaking necessitated the use of a
delegation model. So, why has the same acknowledgment not been made
with respect to the more recent use of the staffer-delegation model? In the
decades since the New Deal, after all, the complexity of Congress’s regula-
tory tasks has only grown. In their 1981 study of Congress, Salisbury and
Shepsle could observe that: “[T]he sheer scope and complexity of the legis-
lative agenda make it impossible for . . . [a] member to master the substance
of every issue sufficiently well to reach in isolation a judgment about how to
vote.”162 More recently, Lawrence Lessig has added that: “[I]t is literally
impossible [for members to read all the bills for themselves] today: the
complexity of the bills Congress considers is vastly greater than in the past.
The Senate version of the health care reform bill, for example, was more
157 Nicholas Ballasy, Conyers Sees No Point in Members Reading 1,000-Page Health
Care Bill—Unless They Have 2 Lawyers to Interpret It for Them, CNS NEWS (July 27, 2009,
7:04 AM), https://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/conyers-sees-no-point-members-reading-
1000-page-health-care-bill-unless-they-have-2 [https://perma.cc/A92A-VRKD].
158 See, e.g., G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 94–127 (2000)
(reviewing repeated assertions since the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 that agency delega-
tion was a response to the rise in the “complexity” of modern lawmaking).
159 See, e.g., Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935) (“Undoubtedly
legislation must often be adapted to complex conditions involving a host of details with which
the national Legislature cannot deal directly.”); United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator
Co., 287 U.S. 77, 85 (1932) (acknowledging that lawmaking had taken on a “variety and need
of detailed statement [that] it was impracticable for Congress to prescribe”); Union Bridge
Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364, 387 (1907) (writing that to deny Congress the power to
delegate “would be ‘to stop the wheels of government’ and bring about confusion, if not paral-
ysis, in the conduct of the public business”).
160 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
161 Id. at 372.
162 Salisbury & Shepsle, supra note 2, at 565. R
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than two thousand pages long when introduced.”163 Similarly, Judge
Katzmann recently observed: “[Members of Congress] cannot read every
word of the bills they vote upon, and, indeed, reading every word is often
not particularly instructive, to the degree bills contain language amending
the United States Code or enacted statutes” because such language often is
exceedingly difficult to understand.164
In short, the delegation-based approach to legislation is not the result of
members of Congress simply being busy. Rather, this approach is the
method by which Congress has chosen to negotiate two conflicting and sta-
ble forces: a set of constitutional imperatives written in a generalist era, on
the one hand, and the reality of a hyper-specialized, complex bureaucratic
world, on the other hand. Neither of these two forces shows any signs of
waning or wavering in the foreseeable future. As such, courts can—and
should—be confident that modern statutes are the product of significant
delegations to staffers.
III. TEMPLATE FOR A NEW DOCTRINE: KING V. BURWELL
The congressional divisions of labor described in Part II—divisions
which assign statutory purpose and statutory text to different congressional
actors—provide good reason for courts to modify their approach to statutory
interpretation. In particular, courts ought to consider adopting a new doctrine
of statutory interpretation—one labeled here as the “staffer’s error doctrine.”
This Part prefaces the argument that will be made in Part IV for this
“staffer’s error doctrine.” It does so by examining a recent case that can
provide a useful model for this new doctrine: King v. Burwell.
Section A reviews the Court’s decision in King. Section B then explains
how this decision looks different—and useful—once it is viewed in light of
modern congressional divisions of labor.
A. The Court’s Reasoning in King v. Burwell
In King, the Court had to interpret a provision in the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act that awards tax credits to low-income individu-
als—tax credits that are designed to make it financially feasible for these
individuals to purchase health insurance.165 Under the provision, the amount
of the tax credit depends partly on whether the individual has enrolled in an
insurance plan through an “Exchange established by the State under section
1311 of the [Act].”166 If this reference to an “Exchange established by the
163
LESSIG, supra note 69, at 126.
164
KATZMANN, supra note 68, at 18.
165 Affordable Care Act § 1401(a), 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2012 & Supp. V 2017). Individuals
must have a household income between 100 percent and 400 percent of the federal poverty
line to qualify for the tax credit. See id. § 36B(c)(1)(A).
166 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)–(c).
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State” did not capture exchanges established by the federal government (as
well as those established by a state), then low-income individuals residing in
states that had federal exchanges would be calculated to receive no tax credit
under the provision. However, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) had
interpreted this reference to an “Exchange established by the State under
section 1311 of the [Act]” to apply more broadly. This reference included
federal as well as state exchanges, the IRS argued—an interpretation which
assured that all low-income individuals throughout the nation would have
access to the tax credit.167 In King v. Burwell, the Court was faced with a
challenge to this IRS interpretation.
In its opinion, the Court essentially conceded that the plain meaning of
the statutory text in the tax credit provision, if considered alone, referred
exclusively to state exchanges. As the Court put it: “[T]he meaning of the
phrase ‘an Exchange established by the State under [section 1311 of the
Act]’ [seems] plain when viewed in isolation.”168 Consequently, the Court
confessed that: “Petitioners’ arguments about the plain meaning of [the tax
credit provision] are strong.”169
However, the Court was not content to resolve the case based solely
upon the plain meaning of the statutory provision. Instead, the Court sought
to develop an understanding of the purpose and scheme of the statute—and
to determine whether the plain meaning, if applied, would allow that purpose
to be realized.170
In conducting this purposive inquiry, the Court discovered that the Af-
fordable Care Act was designed to achieve an overarching goal: to increase
the number of individuals who were able to participate in insurance mar-
kets.171 In order to achieve this goal, the Court found, Congress sought to
enact three interlocking reforms.172 First, Congress sought to implement a
requirement that, whenever an insurer sells health insurance, the insurer
must make the insurance available to all individuals who want to purchase it
(a reform implemented via the “guaranteed issue” and “community rating”
requirements).173 By itself, however, this reform would allow individuals to
167 See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2487–88.
168 Id. at 2495.
169 Id.
170 For the Court’s understanding of the statute’s purpose, see infra notes 173–77 and ac-
companying text. For the idea of checking whether the purpose would be realized, see King,
135 S. Ct. at 2495 (“In this instance, the context and structure of the Act compel us to depart
from what would otherwise be the most natural reading of the pertinent statutory phrase.”).
171 See, e.g., King, 135 S. Ct. at 2493 (“[T]hese three reforms work together to expand
insurance coverage.”).
172 See id. at 2486–87 (“The Affordable Care Act adopts a version of the three key re-
forms that made the Massachusetts system successful. . . . These three reforms are closely
intertwined.”).
173 As the Court put it: “First, the Act adopts the guaranteed issue and community rating
requirements.” Id. at 2482. “Guaranteed issue” means that health insurers are required to sell
(or “issue”) insurance to individuals; “community rating” means that health insurers must sell
that insurance to all individuals (i.e., to the “community”) at a substantially similar price (or
“rate”). See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (2012).
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wait until they became ill to purchase health insurance—a practice known as
“adverse selection” that could cause health insurance markets to collapse.174
Consequently, the Court discovered, Congress also enacted a second reform:
a mandate that all individuals either maintain health insurance, or else make
a payment to the IRS.175 This “individual mandate” created another problem,
however. By itself, it would require low-income individuals to purchase
something they could not afford (viz., health insurance). Consequently, the
Court found, Congress enacted a third reform. It provided low-income indi-
viduals with tax credits that could be used to purchase the health insurance
that they were required to buy under the individual mandate.176
Through its purposive analysis, therefore, the Court discovered that the
tax credit provision was meant to serve a specific purpose: namely, to allow
Congress’s first two reforms to take effect—including with respect to low-
income individuals—in a manner that would avoid the catastrophic conse-
quences of “adverse selection.”177 Tax credits would allow the guaranteed
issue, community rating, and individual mandate reforms to operate in a way
that would not threaten to collapse health insurance markets around the
country.
When viewed in light of this intended purpose, the Court explained, it
was clear that the phrase “Exchange established by the State under section
1311 of the [Act]” was intended as a reference to both federal and state
exchanges.178 After all, tax credits were Congress’s strategy to prevent its
other reforms from collapsing health insurance markets. Every state was
subject to these other reforms. The overwhelming weight of the purposive
evidence suggested that Congress wanted to achieve the same results in all
states. Tax credits were essential to achieving this. As the Court put it:
“Those credits are necessary for the Federal Exchanges to function like their
State Exchange counterparts, and to avoid the type of calamitous result that
Congress plainly meant to avoid.”179 Consequently, the Court concluded,
statutory purpose plainly pointed toward a specific answer to the question at
174 Health insurance companies rely on premiums from healthy individuals to subsidize
care for the ill, so an imbalance in healthy-versus-ill individuals can undermine the market. See
King, 135 S. Ct. at 2485 (“The guaranteed issue and community rating requirements achieved
that goal, but they had an unintended consequence: They encouraged people to wait until they
got sick to buy insurance. Why buy insurance coverage when you are healthy, if you can buy
the same coverage for the same price when you become ill? This consequence [is] known as
‘adverse selection’ . . . .”).
175 Affordable Care Act § 1401(a), 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2012 & Supp. V 2017).
176 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2487 (“Third, the Act seeks to make insurance more affordable by
giving refundable tax credits to individuals with household incomes between 100 percent and
400 percent of the federal poverty line.”).
177 See id. at 2486–87.
178 Id. at 2495.
179 Id. at 2484; see also id. at 2496 (“Congress passed the Affordable Care Act to improve
health insurance markets, not to destroy them.”).
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issue in the case: the phrase “Exchange established by a State under section
1311 of the [Act]” was meant to capture both federal and state exchanges.180
In King v. Burwell, therefore, the Court confronted a situation in which,
by the Court’s own admission, statutory purpose was in tension with statu-
tory text. How would the Court resolve this conflict? “In this instance,” the
Court stated, “the context and structure of the Act compel us to depart from
what would otherwise be the most natural reading of the pertinent statutory
phrase.”181 Statutory purpose prevailed, the Court said—and it prevailed
specifically at the expense of the plain meaning of statutory text.182
B. The Court’s Reasoning and the Staffer-Delegation Model
While the Court’s opinion in King v. Burwell took recourse to statutory
purpose, its methodology was not one that, under the typical conception,
would be considered “purposive.” After all, the Court did not use statutory
purpose to fill every gap or to resolve every ambiguity in the statute—situa-
tions in which statutory purpose is being extended into marginal applica-
tions.183 Instead, the Court in King did something different: namely, it
reviewed an isolated provision of statutory text in order to ensure that this
text did not wholly collapse the basic purpose of the statute.
When viewed in light of Congress’s current division of labor, this pur-
pose-based review of statutory text takes on an important new light. Within
the staffer-delegation model, it will be recalled, members of Congress have
delegated to staffers the minutiae involved in producing statutory text. How-
ever, members have retained personal responsibility for devising, reviewing,
and approving statutory purpose. By reviewing an isolated provision of stat-
utory text in order to ensure that it did not undermine statutory purpose,
therefore, the Court effectively reviewed the work product of congressional
staffers to ensure that it did not undermine the decisions made by elected
members of Congress. Viewed as such, the Court in King v. Burwell devel-
oped a method of statutory interpretation that, in the context of the modern
180 135 S. Ct. at 2487.
181 Id. at 2495.
182 For an admonition not to interpret the Court’s ruling “as a text-versus-purpose show-
down,” as the present Article does, see Abbe Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts:
Understanding Congress’s Plan in the Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62,
66 (2015).
183 The label of “purposivism” can be applied to many interpretive theories, of course, and
it perhaps is reductive to assert that purposivism is defined as an interpretive model that takes
recourse to statutory purpose in order to resolve statutory ambiguities, including those that
bear on instances of marginal applications. Since the Court’s renewed emphasis on the plain
meaning rule in the Burger era, however, the Court has moved away from the strongest forms
of purposivism that might use statutory purpose to overcome plain statutory text and toward
narrowed versions that take recourse to purpose in situations of ambiguity. See generally
Bressman & Gluck, supra note 60, at 407–09 (recounting the evolution of the Court’s uses of R
legislative history and statutory purpose since the Burger era).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\56-1\HLL101.txt unknown Seq: 39  1-MAR-19 11:03
2019] The Staffer’s Error Doctrine 121
Congress, serves an interesting function: namely, it provides a means by
which courts can protect legislatures from the errors of unelected staffers.
IV. THE STAFFER’S ERROR DOCTRINE
A. Precedent: The Scrivener’s Error Doctrine
Several critics have argued that the Court’s interpretive approach in
King v. Burwell was illegitimate.184 The most notable of these was Justice
Scalia, whose dissenting opinion was quick to criticize the majority for ex-
ceeding the scope of its powers within our constitutional system. As Justice
Scalia put it: “This Court . . . has no free-floating power ‘to rescue Congress
from its drafting errors.’” 185 However, when viewed as rescuing elected
members of Congress from drafting errors committed by unelected agents of
Congress, there is a time-tested judicial canon which suggests that courts do
indeed have this power: the scrivener’s error doctrine.
In statutory interpretation, the scrivener’s error doctrine posits that
judges have the authority—and, arguably, the obligation—to identify and
correct a narrow set of technical mistakes in statutes (such as punctuation
errors).186 Why have courts believed themselves to be justified in correcting
this set—and only this set—of statutory errors? According to Justice Scalia
himself (along with coauthor Bryan Garner), this doctrine has historically
been justified by a specific theory: one that, in the following pages, will be
described as the “division-of-labor theory.”
As described by Scalia and Garner, this division-of-labor theory has
two components. First, the theory posits that, under the scrivener’s error doc-
trine, judges have traditionally been allowed to correct a narrow set of statu-
184 See, e.g., Elizabeth Price Foley & David Rivkin, Symposium: Bypassing Separation of
Powers to “Fix” Sloppy Laws, SCOTUSBLOG (June 25, 2015, 6:35 PM), http://www.scotus
blog.com/2015/06/symposium-bypassing-separation-of-powers-to-fix-sloppy-laws/ [https://
perma.cc/8SAW-6S4X] (arguing that, in King, the Court effectively acted as an “unconstitu-
tional Council of Revision”).
185 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2504 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Lamie v. United States Trus-
tee, 540 U.S. 526, 542 (2004)).
186 For differing views on the scope of the doctrine, see, for example, United States v.
Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 120–26 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (applying the doctrine to applica-
tion dates); Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 U.S. 341, 344 (1932) (arguing that the doctrine should
apply to syntax as well as punctuation); Barrett v. Van Pelt, 268 U.S. 85, 91 (1925) (saying that
the doctrine should only apply to punctuation); Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309 v.
Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., 448 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 2006) (Bybee, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that the doctrine should only apply to instances of nonsensical or ungrammatical sentences
or erroneous cross-references). For a modern argument that the doctrine should encompass any
statutory text that appears on the face of the statute to be an error, regardless of the nature of
the error, see SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 133, at 235–36. See generally Ryan D. Doerfler,
The Scrivener’s Error, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 811 (2016) (discussing and critiquing this iteration
of the doctrine). For a discussion of the particular iteration that the Court had been applying
leading up to King—viz., the doctrine of mistake outlined in Lamie v. United States Trustee—
see Gluck, supra note , at 103–05.
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tory errors because such errors have been “thought to be the work of the
engrossing clerk or the printer” rather than of the legislators themselves.187
In other words, the doctrine has targeted minor typographical features be-
cause the insertion of these features into statutory text—a specific drafting
task—has been assumed to be a task performed by unelected staffers. Sec-
ond, the theory holds that the doctrine is further justified by the fact that:
“[I]n days of yore . . . because many legislators voted only on the basis of
bills that they heard read aloud—without seeing the printed page—they
could take no notice of the punctuation marks.”188 Put differently, the doc-
trine has been further justified by the fact that staffers, not legislators, tradi-
tionally have provided the pre-enactment review of these typographical
features. According to Scalia and Garner, therefore, the scrivener’s error
doctrine targeted certain typographical errors because the doctrine was de-
signed to allow judges to review—and to correct—those portions of statutes
that legislators typically neither draft nor subject to pre-enactment review.
This division-of-labor view of the doctrine is not specific to Scalia and
Garner. It is embedded, for example, in the very name that judges and schol-
ars have accepted as the proper label for the doctrine: the scrivener’s error
doctrine.189 This moniker rests upon two assumptions: first, that a division of
tasks exists within a legislature (viz., between legislators and “scriveners”),
and second, that courts should correct errors made by a specific institutional
actor within this internal bureaucracy (viz., the scrivener).190 These same as-
sumptions are found in the oft-repeated idea that the doctrine allows judges
to correct “clerical” errors in statutes—a description which assumes that
such errors result from the work of “clerks,” as Scalia and Garner put it,
187
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 133, at 161 (quoting Morrill v. State, 38 Wis. 428, 434
(1875)).
188 Id. (quoting James DeWitt Andrews, Statutory Construction, in 14 AMERICAN LAW
AND PROCEDURE 1, 47 (James Parker Hall & James DeWitt Andrews eds., rev. ed. 1948)).
189 Jonathan Siegel has traced the use of this label for the doctrine, saying:
[T]he National Bank case is the first in which the Court invoked the term “scriv-
ener’s error” in exercising the power of statutory correction. Neither the Court nor
any Justice used the term before 1985, when Justice Stevens used it in his opinion in
United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 123 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Older cases
from other courts show the term used almost invariably in connection with errors
made either by private parties in drafting contracts or similar instruments or by
courts or court clerks in connection with judgments. Courts consider themselves em-
powered to disregard such errors. See, e.g., Christensen v. Felton, 322 F.2d 323, 325
(9th Cir. 1963) (disregarding a scrivener’s error in a contract). But at least some older
cases use the term with reference to judicial reform of statutes. See, e.g., In re Deuel,
101 N.Y.S. 1037, 1038–39 (N.Y. App. Div. 1906) (correcting a “scrivener’s error”
that resulted in the omission of the term “not” in a statute).
Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 117, 146
n.152 (2009).
190 As other scholars have noted, this term is taken from the field of contract law, where it
was preceded by the term vitium scriptoris—literally, the “mistake of a scribe.” See David M.
Sollors, The War on Error: The Scrivener’s Error Doctrine and Textual Criticism: Confronting
Errors in Statutes and Literary Texts, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 459, 461 (2009).
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rather than of legislators.191 As Scalia and Garner note, these are assumptions
that have a long history in statutory interpretation—assumptions that are
brought to the fore by these widely used labels.192
According to the division-of-labor theory, therefore, the scrivener’s er-
ror doctrine embodies two insights. First, the doctrine acknowledges the re-
ality that a division of tasks regularly occurs within legislatures. Second, the
doctrine advances the basic idea that, when legislatures do indeed divide
legislative tasks among different actors, courts have a role to play in protect-
ing and preserving the decisions that democratically elected legislators are
making within this institution—including by protecting them from the errors
of unelected agents who assume some of the tasks of statutory production.193
In order to properly serve this protective function, however, the scope
of the review that judges perform under the doctrine must track the actual
division of tasks within the legislature. To the extent that it is desirable for
the doctrine to serve this function with respect to federal statutes, therefore,
it is necessary for the doctrine to be grounded in a realistic, up-to-date un-
derstanding of the inner workings of Congress. In particular, the doctrine
must be anchored in an accurate understanding of the range of tasks that
members of Congress actually delegate to unelected staffers and agents.
In this regard, modern judges have failed in their task of ensuring that
the scrivener’s error doctrine remains vital and coherent. While the number
of legislative tasks performed by congressional staffers has dramatically ex-
panded in the staffer-delegation era, this expansion has not been accompa-
nied by a corresponding growth in the number of statutory features that
judges will review for errors under the scrivener’s error doctrine. Instead, the
doctrine has retained a narrow focus upon the drafting issues that were han-
191
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 133, at 161. For descriptions of the doctrine as address-
ing “clerical” errors, see, for example, Ass’n of Tex. Prof’l Educators v. Kirby, 788 S.W.2d
827, 830 (Tex. 1990) (stating that a refusal to correct such errors would “amount to govern-
ment by clerical error”); Michael S. Fried, A Theory of Scrivener’s Error, 52 RUTGERS L. REV.
589, 593 (2000) (“‘Scrivener’s error’ refers to a typographical mistake or other error of a
clerical nature in the drafting of a document.”).
192 A cursory review by Scalia and Garner finds these assumptions in a legal textbook
from 1948, SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 133, at 161 (citing James DeWitt Andrews, supra
note 188), and in a court case from 1875, see id. (citing Morrill, 38 Wis. at 434). Other cases R
also evince these assumptions. See U.S. Nat’l Bank of Ore. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc.,
508 U.S. 439, 462 (1993) (“[W]e are convinced that the placement of the quotation marks in
the 1916 Act was a simple scrivener’s error, a mistake made by someone unfamiliar with the
law’s object and design.”) (emphasis added); In re Deuel, 101 N.Y.S. at 1038–39.
193 In the recent oral arguments for Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 958 (2016) Jus-
tice Breyer interestingly articulated both of these principles in a different context—namely, in
the context of construing statutory ambiguity, not of remedying evident drafting errors—and
he seemed interested in updating them to reflect modern congressional divisions of labor. See
Transcript of Oral Argument at 39–40, Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 958 (2016) (No.
14-8358), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_ arguments/argument_transcripts/2015/14-
8358_i3kn.pdf [https://perma.cc/US84-U76S]. Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts re-
sponded by voicing skepticism that this division of labor exists. Id. at 42.
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dled by unelected staffers in the “days of yore,” as Scalia and Garner put
it.194
As such, those who wish to see this doctrine continue to perform the
function implied by the division-of-labor theory need to do more than simply
defend the original, antiquated formulation of this doctrine. They also need
to advocate for the doctrine to be expanded in a manner that would permit
judges, in the search for errors, to review all aspects of statutes that members
routinely assign to staffers in the modern Congress. Under such an expan-
sion, the doctrine presumably would allow judges to review all statutory text
(i.e., the work of today’s unelected staffers) for errors.
Interestingly, this is the review that the Court actually performed in
King v. Burwell. The Court essentially reviewed statutory text for a specific,
particularly egregious type of staffer error. By scanning statutory text for
any conflicts with broad statutory purpose, it effectively looked for staffer
errors that had undermined a decision that members of Congress had directly
and personally made with respect to a statute. By contrast, the Court did not
seek out staffer choices that, while perhaps “errors” in the sense that they
violated members’ presumed but unexpressed wishes, nonetheless did not
violate any concrete decisions made by members—staffer choices that there-
fore would not present instances of staffers exceeding their delegations. In-
stead, the Court’s review functioned simply as a check for staffer errors that
were so egregious as to undermine core statutory purpose—which is to say,
for errors that would undermine the basic goal that members of Congress
would have entrusted to them.
Through its use of this review, therefore, the Court in King v. Burwell
effectively created a model for a narrow but updated version of the scriv-
ener’s error doctrine—a version that, in order to reflect this updated quality,
might be described as a “staffer’s error doctrine.” It is a doctrine that begins
with the principles that animated the original scrivener’s error doctrine—and
that combines these principles with an awareness that today’s staffers per-
form a wider range of lawmaking functions than did the “scriveners” of old.
By essentially creating such a “staffer’s error doctrine,” the Court (perhaps
inadvertently) found a way to make these principles relevant once again—
and its interpretive approach should be considered in light of this underap-
preciated merit.
B. Administration of the Staffer’s Error Doctrine
By revisiting the Court’s method in King v. Burwell, therefore—and re-
reading this method in light of both the historical purpose of the scrivener’s
error doctrine and the drafting practices of the modern Congress—we can
discover the possibility of a new “staffer’s error doctrine.” This doctrine
would direct judges to identify instances in which the work product of staff-
194
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 133, at 161.
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ers (viz., statutory text) undermined rather than advanced decisions made
directly by members of Congress (viz., the selection of overarching policy
goals). As such, the doctrine gives rise to the question: how, as a practical
matter, would courts administer this doctrine?
One potential answer to these questions is found in the template that the
Court provided in King v. Burwell. In this case, the Court’s reasoning sug-
gested a three-step review process that a court could conduct after develop-
ing its initial interpretation of a statute. In the first step of this review
process, courts would identify the overarching policy goals that a statute is
designed to achieve. In King v. Burwell, for example, the Court used a num-
ber of sources in order to reconstruct the statute’s purpose. It looked at find-
ings that Congress inserted into the statute,195 external sources that
documented the historical context of the legislation (including amicus briefs,
scholarly articles, and congressional hearings),196 and the operative provi-
sions of the statute.
Having identified the statute’s overarching policy goals, courts then
would move to the second step of this three-step review: they would check
whether the isolated snippet of statutory text before them, if applied as writ-
ten, would sabotage those overarching policy goals. This, it should be noted,
is a high threshold. The threshold is high for a reason: the process is tailored
to catch only those passages of statutory text that represent instances in
which staffers have wholly exceeded the scope of their delegation. Given the
broad authority that staffers now possess to engage in interstitial policymak-
ing, a staffer who produces a statutory regime filled with exceptions, exemp-
tions, and anomalies can hardly be said to have exceeded the scope of his or
her delegation. Consequently, the discovery of a mere policy anomaly or
inconsistency would not suffice for purposes of this review. Rather, this step
two review would seek to identify instances in which the statutory text at
issue, if applied, would so thoroughly undermine the core policy goals of the
statute—or carry the statute so dramatically far afield of these goals—that
the statute could no longer be characterized, in any accurate sense, as a rea-
soned implementation of those basic goals.
In such situations, courts could proceed to the third step of the review.
When a divide between purpose and text emerges, this final step directs
courts to do the difficult work of investigating whether the divide is more
195 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2486–87, 2493 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(I) (2012)).
196 See id. at 2486 (citing Examining Individual State Experiences with Health Care Re-
form Coverage Initiatives in the Context of National Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions, 111th Cong. 9 (2009) (statement of John Kingsdale,
Ph.D., Executive Director, Commonwealth Health Insurance Connector); Brief for America’s
Health Insurance Plans as Amicus Curiae at 10–11, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015)
(No. 14-114); Brief for Bipartisan Economic Scholars as Amici Curiae at 24–25, King v.
Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 14-114); LEIGH WACHENHEIM & HANS LEIDA, THE IM-
PACT OF GUARANTEED ISSUE AND COMMUNITY RATING REFORMS ON STATES’ INDIVIDUAL IN-
SURANCE MARKETS 38 (2012), http://www.statecoverage.org/files/Updated-Milliman-Report_
GI_and_Comm_Rating_March_2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/8SCD-DV2F]).
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likely the result of a mistaken view, among the court, of the statute’s pur-
pose—or, instead, of a drafting error in Congress.
Applying this step in King v. Burwell, the Court found significant evi-
dence, on the one hand, that the statutory text at issue resulted from a draft-
ing error. This text was found within a statute that contained many instances
of “inartful drafting”197 and that was subject to unique procedural challenges
that limited the opportunities for pre-enactment review.198 The specific
phrases that seemed plain in the relevant provision were used sloppily and
inconsistently throughout the bill,199 and its plain meaning would interact in
odd ways with other provisions in the bill.200 The Court further observed that
other provisions of the bill seemed to assume that the provision at issue
means something other than its plain meaning.201 The result, the Court sug-
gested, was a strong suggestion that the statutory text at issue was the result
of a drafting error.
On the other hand, the Court found little reason to believe that it had
been led astray by the secondary materials relied upon for its purposive anal-
ysis. With the exception of the provision at issue, the Court noted, these
materials closely and accurately tracked the operative provisions of the
bill.202 This inspired confidence that these materials were designed to eluci-
date, not to mislead. The more compelling conclusion, the Court therefore
found, was that the statutory provision at issue was the result of a staffer’s
error.
Through an application of the three-step process of the staffer’s error
doctrine, therefore, the Court essentially concluded that the text at issue in
King v. Burwell was the result of a staffer’s error. This conclusion, it is worth
noting, appears to have been correct; several subsequent investigations have
confirmed the text to have resulted from staffer error.203 As Senator Bin-
gaman (D-N.M.) put it to the New York Times: “As far as I know, [the
relevant statutory text] escaped everyone’s attention, or it would have been
deleted, because it clearly contradicted the main purpose of the legisla-
tion.”204 With respect to the provision at issue in King v. Burwell, therefore,
it seems that the three-step process embedded in the staffer’s error doctrine
successfully performed its intended task: it correctly identified an instance of
197 Id. at 2504.
198 Id.
199 Id. at 2498–99.
200 Id. at 2495.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 Robert Pear, Four Words that Imperil Health Care Law Were All a Mistake, Writers
Now Say, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/26/us/politics/con
tested-words-in-affordable-care-act-may-have-been-left-by-mistake.html [https://perma.cc/
HXV2-HDW6]; see also Gluck, supra note 182; Abbe R. Gluck, Why Health Lawyers Must R
Be Public-Law Lawyers: Health Law in the Age of the Modern Regulatory State, 18 J. HEALTH
CARE L. & POL’Y 323, 325–29 (2015). See generally Doerfler, supra note 186 (canvassing the R
reasons why logically this was likely to be an error).
204 Pear, supra note 203.
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staffer error that undermined core decisions made by members of Con-
gress—and that, consequently, exceeded the scope of staffers’ delegation.
C. The Legitimacy of the Staffer’s Error Doctrine
Through its method of preserving the purpose of the statute, therefore,
the Court’s approach in King v. Burwell had the effect of restoring values
that have long been embedded in statutory interpretation through the scriv-
ener’s error doctrine. Namely, it restored the value of protecting the deci-
sions made by democratically elected members of Congress—including
from the errors made by their agents.
Some may be skeptical of the notion that courts should be in the busi-
ness of advancing this value, however. Such individuals might ask: why
should courts attempt to protect Congress from the errors of its agents? What
provides courts with the authority to adopt this approach? This Section ex-
plores possible answers to these questions. In particular, it examines the rea-
sons why both intentionalists and textualists might be persuaded that courts
have the authority to utilize this “staffer’s error doctrine.” To this end, Sub-
section 1 details the reasons why intentionalists ought to view this doctrine
as legitimate—regardless of whether this new doctrine is viewed as a seman-
tic canon or a substantive canon. Subsection 2 then outlines the reasons why,
under four prominent versions of textualism, the doctrine similarly appears
to be a legitimate tool of statutory interpretation.
1. Intentionalism and the Staffer’s Error Doctrine
One way to conceptualize the staffer’s error doctrine is as an interpre-
tive tool that assists judges in the specific task of uncovering and enforcing
legislative intent. According to the division-of-labor theory, the doctrine pro-
vides this assistance by directing judges to examine the work product of
unelected staffers and, in so doing, to ensure that this work product has ad-
vanced, rather than undermined, the intent of legislators.205 For intentional-
ists, it is a check premised on the notion that portions of statutes handled
exclusively by unelected staffers are uniquely at risk of having veered away
from legislative intent. By permitting (and perhaps requiring) judges to con-
duct this review, the staffer’s error doctrine thereby protects and preserves
the intent of legislators, guarding it from incursions by staffers.
Viewed as such, the doctrine clearly accords with intentionalist notions
of the proper judicial role in statutory interpretation. As John Manning puts
it: “[Intentionalists have] long emphasized that, as faithful agents of Con-
gress, federal courts have a constitutional duty to implement Congress’s ‘in-
205 For Justice Breyer suggesting that judges, in situations of statutory ambiguity (as op-
posed to situations of error), might work to excavate the “general intention” that legislators
entrust to drafters in the modern congressional bureaucracy, see Transcript of Oral Argument,
supra note 193, at 40.
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tent.’” 206 The staffer’s error doctrine can be understood as assisting courts in
their effort to serve as “faithful agents” of the sort that Manning describes.
By contrast, what is less evident is whether the staffer’s error doctrine—
when viewed through this intentionalist lens—should be considered a se-
mantic canon or a substantive canon of statutory construction.207 The answer
to this question depends upon one’s theory of the proper dividing line be-
tween these two categories of canons. According to some scholars, the dif-
ference between these two types of canons resides in the role that courts
perform when using the canon. Semantic canons are designed to assist the
courts in their role as faithful agents of Congress, the theory goes.208 By
contrast, substantive canons allow judges to inject extrinsic values into the
legal process, thereby allowing judges to operate as cooperative partners that
partake, alongside Congress, in the shared activity of lawmaking.209 Viewed
as such, the staffer’s error doctrine is best characterized as a semantic canon,
since it assists the court in its role as a faithful agent of Congress.
According to other scholars, however, the difference between the two
types of canons resides in the canons’ differing relationships to statutory text.
Semantic canons are rules of language usage that reveal the meaning embed-
ded within statutory text, these scholars argue,210 whereas substantive canons
impose values that are external to the text.211 According to this view of the
canons, the staffer’s error doctrine is a substantive canon since, in most itera-
tions, it explicitly goes beyond the text of the statute.212 Understood as such,
the staffer’s error doctrine serves to advance a particular substantive value:
the constitutional value of popular sovereignty.213
This theory of the staffer’s error doctrine relies upon a particular, inten-
tionalist-friendly vision of popular sovereignty. Under this vision, the gov-
ernmental architecture created by the Constitution is viewed as a means to
an end. It is designed to allow the democratic will to flow outward from the
206 See John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2395 (2003).
207 For an argument that it is not a doctrine of statutory interpretation at all but instead is
an application of strict scrutiny to Article I, Section 7, see Fried, supra note 191, at 609.
208 See ESKRIDGE, GLUCK & NOURSE, supra note 14, at 458 (noting that grammar canons R
are employed in part because “the legislature is presumed to know and follow basic conven-
tions of grammar and syntax”).
209 See, e.g., Andrew C. Spiropoulos, A Defense of Substantive Canons of Construction,
2001 UTAH L. REV. 915, 919 (2001) (“[B]y expecting judges to articulate and adhere to
substantive canons of construction, we encourage judges to think of themselves as partners in
the enterprise of lawmaking, rather than simple agents who are forced to accept bad policy.”).
210 See, e.g., Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 STAN. L.
REV. 999, 1004 (2015) (noting that semantic canons “purport to reflect the meaning of the
statutory language”).
211 See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L.
REV. 109, 110 (2010) (“[I]t is generally recognized that substantive canons advance policies
independent of those expressed in the statute.”).
212 For a version that might not go beyond statutory text, see infra notes 219–23 and
accompanying text.
213 On the idea that popular sovereignty is the single, overarching idea that animates the
Constitution, see, for example, AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY
13 (2006) (explaining popular sovereignty as “the Constitution’s bedrock idea”).
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public, through and across a variety of governmental actors and institutions,
and back to the public as enforceable laws.
Within this constitutional architecture, the argument goes, the Founders
outlined four important transition points. These are instances where the dem-
ocratic will must be transferred from one constitutional actor to another.
First, the democratic will must transfer from the public to members of Con-
gress. This occurs primarily through the mechanism of elections.214 Second,
democratic will must transfer from members of Congress to legal texts. This
occurs through the process of enacting laws.215 Third, democratic will needs
to transfer from legal texts to the executive and judicial branches. This is
accomplished through the interpretation of laws.216 Fourth, the democratic
will transfers back to the public. This occurs through the enforcement of
laws.
Under the popular sovereignty view, the underlying purpose of many
constitutional provisions is to ensure that these transfers are successful. Con-
sider the first transition point: the transfer of democratic will from the public
to members of Congress.217 A host of constitutional provisions are designed
in the effort to ensure that this transfer is successful. The provisions requir-
ing regular elections are the most notable example.218 As Publius puts it in
his analysis of the House of Representatives in Federalist No. 52:
As it is essential to liberty that the government in general should
have a common interest with the people, so it is particularly essen-
tial that the [House of Representatives] should have an immediate
dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people. Fre-
quent elections are unquestionably the only policy by which this
dependence and sympathy can be effectually secured.219
The election provisions of Article I tether members of Congress to the
public in two different senses. First, they require each member to have been
recently selected by the public—something likely to happen only if the
member is broadly sympathetic with the will of that public.220 Second, regu-
lar elections warn each member of Congress that another election will be
occurring soon. The anticipation of such elections is meant to force members
214
U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2–6.
215
U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 7–8.
216
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; id. art. II, § 1.
217 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, at 327 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(“The scheme of representation [is] a substitute for a meeting of the citizens in person.”).
218
U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2–3.
219
THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, supra note 217, at 327. R
220 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 60 (Alexander Hamilton) (explaining that the public will
elect representatives who mirror their interests); see also Jacob E. Gersen & Matthew C. Ste-
phenson, Over-Accountability, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 185, 189 (2014) (describing this “selec-
tion effect” as a feature of accountability mechanisms in principal-agent relationships).
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of Congress to internalize the interests of their communities, since most
members would presumably want to be reelected.221
Elections were not the sole mechanism that the Founders used in order
to transform members of Congress into embodiments of the will of their
constituents, however. Publius also outlines a variety of other constitution-
ally induced pressures that would advance this purpose.222 The idea, there-
fore, was that a host of constitutionally induced pressures would uniquely
transform the members of Congress into vessels for the democratic will of
their constituents, and thereby would act as “cords by which [members
would] be bound to fidelity and sympathy with the great mass of the
people.”223
Since this host of pressures would converge only upon members of
Congress, it was essential to popular sovereignty that these individuals par-
ticipate properly in the second transfer point in the constitutional scheme:
the production of binding laws. It was vital that this group could successfully
enact their decisions into law, for this was the activity that would allow the
public will to continue on its path. Consequently, Article I vested the power
to produce these laws exclusively in the members of Congress.224 Moreover,
Article I sought to ensure that no external impediments hindered these mem-
bers in their efforts to successfully navigate this transition point. Conse-
quently, it provided members with broad latitude to decide for themselves
the manner in which to convert the public will into binding legal texts.225
The question posed by the problem of staffer’s errors is the following:
what should courts do when this second transfer point within the constitu-
tional scheme fails? What should courts do when there is compelling evi-
dence that the will of members of Congress—itself a proxy for the will of
the public—was not successfully encoded within statutory text?
221 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 57 (James Madison) (stating that anticipation of elections will
create fidelity to public will).
222 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 56, at 293 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (on
requirements that members of Congress be inhabitants of the states they represent); id. at 297
(on members being subject to the laws they make); THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, supra note 136 R
(on the process of elections, and on bicameralism); THE FEDERALIST NO. 63 (James Madison)
(on bicameralism); see also Gersen & Stephenson, supra note 220, at 189 (describing this R
“incentive effect” as a feature of accountability mechanisms in principal-agent relationships).
223
THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, supra note 221, at 353. R
224
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (vesting “All legislative Powers” in Congress). Sections 1 and 2
of Article I made it clear that “Congress” was understood here to mean, specifically, the
collection of the members of Congress. Id. §§ 1–2. The presentment requirement also involves
a democratically elected president in this process, of course.
225 Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution grants Congress great flexibility in determining
the methods by which it will draft, review, and approve legislation. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
Meanwhile, the legislative power under Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution (along with the
Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I, Section 8) gives Congress latitude to determine how
best to pursue its legislative ends (including the power to create legislative branch officers via
statute that might assist Congress with its lawmaking duties). U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 8; see
also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90 (1976).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\56-1\HLL101.txt unknown Seq: 49  1-MAR-19 11:03
2019] The Staffer’s Error Doctrine 131
As a substantive canon, the staffer’s error doctrine asserts that courts
have an active role to play in this situation. They can legitimately act to
reconnect statutory text to a decision made by elected representatives and, in
so doing, can thereby restore the flow of the public’s will through the archi-
tecture of the federal government. In this way, the staffer’s error doctrine
functions to advance the constitutional value of popular sovereignty. As
such, it can be treated much like other substantive canons that advance con-
stitutional values, such as the constitutional avoidance canon and the federal-
ism canons.226 Like those other canons, it operates as “quasi-constitutional
law,” as Eskridge and Frickey put it.227 It uses statutory interpretation as a
vehicle to preserve a structural constitutional element—precisely the sort of
element that Eskridge and Frickey describe as the primary concern of this
subset of substantive canons.228
2. Textualism and the Staffer’s Error Doctrine
While the appeal of the staffer’s error doctrine for intentionalists is rela-
tively straightforward, the doctrine’s appeal for textualists is slightly more
complex. This is true for two reasons. First, the doctrine admittedly violates
a tenet that many textualists seek to uphold: the tenet that the plain meaning
of the text must be respected. Second, textualism has been defined and justi-
fied in a variety of different ways (as discussed below), thereby meaning that
no single analysis of the doctrine is likely to endear it to all textualists. Still,
there are several important reasons why the staffer’s error doctrine might be
appealing to textualists.
i. Textualism’s Respect for Historical Pedigree. The historical pedigree
of the scrivener’s error doctrine might be, for some textualists, a sufficient
justification for the continued use of an updated staffer’s error doctrine. After
all, textualists are particularly likely to view the historical pedigree of the
canons as providing justification for interpretive practices that otherwise
might offend textualist principles. As Judge Amy Coney Barrett has put it,
“[t]extualists have suggested that, in the modern landscape, those principles
that we call substantive canons are a closed set of background assumptions
justified by their sheer longevity.”229 Admittedly, some textualists have be-
gun to revise this view, concluding that historical pedigree alone cannot re-
deem canons that conflict with textualist premises—and concluding also that
the scrivener’s error doctrine is fundamentally incompatible with such prem-
ises.230 For others, however—including both textualists and non-textualists—
226 For a catalogue of these canons, see generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45
VAND. L. REV. 593 (1992).
227 Id. at 597.
228 Id.
229 Barrett, supra note 211, at 111. R
230 See, e.g., Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309 v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., 448
F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 2006) (Bybee, J., dissenting) (sharply limiting the doctrine based on
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the historical pedigree of the scrivener’s error doctrine alone may suggest
that the staffer’s error doctrine possesses a claim to legitimacy.
Moreover, Judge Barrett has documented a second reason why the
longstanding use of the scrivener’s error doctrine might persuade textualists
that this doctrine’s successor, the staffer’s error doctrine, is legitimate. Ac-
cording to Barrett, the canons of construction were widely accepted as legiti-
mate exercises of the judicial function at the time of the Founding.231 In this
regard, Barrett notes,232 the canons are immune to John Manning’s claim that
non-textualist methods of interpretation exceed the original understanding
“the judicial Power” conferred upon federal judges by Article III.233
Indeed, Judge Barrett makes this claim as someone sympathetic to
Manning’s general claim about “the judicial Power” (a claim that others
have disputed).234 Once the Court’s approach in King v. Burwell is under-
stood as a coherent application of the idea underlying the scrivener’s error
doctrine, therefore, this approach may elide the constitutional concerns that
trouble textualists such as Manning.
ii. Textualism as an Application of Congressional Intent. Some textual-
ists, including both Caleb Nelson and John Manning, have sometimes ac-
cepted the idea that courts should seek—and enforce—Congress’s “intent.”
According to these scholars, textualism is a preferred interpretive method
simply because it is the best way for courts to discern and apply congres-
sional intent. For textualists of this variety, the staffer’s error doctrine should
have significant appeal.235 In order to understand this appeal, it is worth ex-
amining the claims made by some of these textualists in detail.
a. Textualism as Applying the Only Available Intent. One version of
this argument—i.e., the argument that textualism is the best method of dis-
covering congressional intent—is well represented by John Manning. Here,
Manning argues that, due to the murkiness of the inner workings of Con-
gress, the intent of Congress is unknowable.236 As Manning puts it: “The
legislative process . . . is too complex, too path-dependent, and too opaque to
allow judges to reconstruct whether Congress would have resolved any par-
ticular question differently from the way the clear statutory text resolves that
textualist principles); see also Manning, supra note 206, at 2391–92 (rejecting absurdity doc-
trine due to this conflict with textualist principles despite acknowledging its pedigree). See
generally John C. Nagle, Textualism’s Exceptions, 2 ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 1 (2002).
231 Barrett, supra note 211, at 110–11. R
232 Id.
233 See also John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 98–108 (2001).
234 See generally, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings
of the “Judicial Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990
(2001) (arguing that “the judicial Power” includes the power of equitable interpretation).
235 Ronald Dworkin also has argued that textualism is grounded upon a form of intention-
alism compatible with the scrivener’s error doctrine. See Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:  FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 115, 116 (Amy Gutmann ed.,
1997).
236 Manning, supra note 206, at 2410. R
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question.”237 In the face of this unknowability, Manning argues, interpreters
have no option but to abandon the search for actual congressional intent.
Consequently, Manning says, interpreters must turn to a second-best form of
intent. An appropriate form of second-best intent is found, he then argues, in
Joseph Raz’s notion that: “Even without knowing the speaker’s actual intent
or purpose in making a statement, one can charge the speaker with the mini-
mum intention ‘to say what one would ordinarily be understood as saying,
given the circumstances in which one said it.’” 238 In this way, Manning be-
gins with a claim about the unknowability of Congress’s intent, and he con-
cludes from it that, in order to operate as faithful agents plausibly carrying
out congressional intent in some manner, courts should turn to textualist
methods.
The use of the staffer’s error doctrine is more consistent with this set of
interpretive assumptions than it might appear. After all, the point made by
Raz is that, when a speaker makes an utterance, the speaker typically can be
assumed to possess an intent to speak the uttered words (and, further, to have
those uttered words interpreted according to prevailing interpretive conven-
tions). Based on our intuitive awareness that this assumption is valid, Raz
argues, we arrive at an everyday interpretive practice under which “the nor-
mal way of finding out what a person intended to say is to establish what he
said.”239 Even Raz accepts, however, that the default use of this “normal
way” of locating intent is subject to rebuttal; it can be overridden by evi-
dence that a specific error occurred in the conversion of an intention into a
speech act. As Raz puts it: “An exception is any explanation of what went
wrong [in the speech act] which establishes either that one was trying or
had formed an intention to say something and failed, or that one did not
mean what one said.”240 The staffer’s error doctrine can be understood sim-
ply as a check to see whether such an explanation exists. For his part, Raz
believes that underlying legislative intentions exist and can be identified
(and, therefore, can be used to check for the existence of such a rebuttal).241
It is Manning who adds the additional idea that legislative intent is unknow-
able. As such, the staffer’s error doctrine is consistent with Raz’s underlying
theory. And it is possible that, while Manning presumably would reject the
turn to intent in these instances, he nonetheless would acknowledge that
237 Id.; see also Caleb Nelson, A Response to Professor Manning, 91 VA. L. REV. 451, 459
(2005) (“According to the textualists, judges who try to reconstruct the legislature’s collective
understandings (if any) by engaging in case-by-case investigation of individual legislators’
actual semantic intentions are doomed to failure; they do not know enough to identify reliably
whatever collective understandings did in fact exist.”).
238 Manning, supra note 206, at 2397–98 (quoting Joseph Raz, Intention in Interpretation, R
in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LEGAL POSITIVISM 249, 268 (Robert P. George ed.,
1996)); see also Manning, supra note 132, at 692 (making the same argument based on Raz’s R
theory).
239 Raz, supra note 238, at 270. R
240 Id.
241 Id. at 263–64.
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these instances present a case in which this justification of textualism en-
counters its limit.
b. Textualism as Applying Intent of a Compromise-Driven Congress.
Manning also offers a second argument suggesting that textualism is the best
method of discovering congressional intent. This argument is based on a
descriptive claim about the inner workings of Congress. The legislative pro-
cess is marked by unprincipled compromises, Manning claims, not by prin-
ciple or by logic.242 Due to the prevalence of legislative bargains, Manning
suggests, statutory text that appears philosophically inconsistent, erroneous,
or even absurd is—more often than not—an accurate reflection of congres-
sional intent.243 Consequently, Manning argues, the best strategy for captur-
ing congressional intent is simply to apply statutory text in all cases. Indeed,
to interpret statutes otherwise would be to trample over bargains struck dur-
ing the legislative process, Manning suggests—an approach that would un-
dermine the power accorded to factions through the process of bicameralism
and presentment.244 In this way, Manning offers a second argument on behalf
of textualist methods—an argument which asserts that these methods pro-
vide the best strategy by which to ascertain the intent of Congress.
An awareness of the staffer-delegation model qualifies Manning’s claim
that Congress is an institution driven by unprincipled compromises. Under
the staffer-delegation model, lawmaking proceeds along two parallel tracks.
Members of Congress make general policy decisions—and these decisions
may be the result of bargains and unprincipled compromises. At the same
time, members task staffers with producing a statute that will carry out these
compromises—and, in so doing, the members frequently will award these
staffers the power to strike further interstitial compromises. What is prohib-
ited within the staffer-delegation model, however, is for staffers to make
compromises that undermine the purposes agreed upon by members. Conse-
quently, Congress is invariably purposive along a particular axis: statutory
text is predictably designed to carry out, not to undermine, whichever purpo-
sive instructions members pass along to staffers. Put differently, delegations
are inherently purposive; they award an agent with authority to pursue a set
of goals (or purposes) on behalf of a principal. Due to the fact that Congress
now predictably relies upon delegations in the production of statutory text,
242 Manning, supra note 206, at 2412; see also Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara R
Cty., 480 U.S. 616, 671 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court for viewing the
provision at issue as an isolated desire to enact a coherent congressional desire, rather than as
an inseparable part of a “total legislative package containing many quids pro quo”).
243 Manning, supra note 206, at 2390. R
244 Manning states:
[T]he Article I, Section 7 requirements of bicameralism and presentment are de-
signed in part to [give] political minorities extraordinary power to withhold their
assent to legislation or, more important, to insist on compromise as the price of
assent. By disturbing the lines of compromise reflected in a clear statute, the absurd-
ity doctrine risks diluting that protection.
Id. at 2391.
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there is a narrow sense in which purposivist interpretation will reliably im-
plement congressional intent—even if Congress otherwise is, as Manning
claims, a compromise-driven institution. For this reason, even those sub-
scribing to Manning’s brand of textualism should acknowledge that the
staffer’s error doctrine, which requires the application of a narrow but rigid
brand of purposivism, constitutes a legitimate exception to that interpretive
methodology.
c. Textualism as Applying Intent While Accounting for Judicial
Strengths and Weaknesses. Caleb Nelson additionally has argued on behalf
of a brand of textualism which accepts the idea that statutory interpreters are
engaged in the task of discerning congressional “intent.” According to Nel-
son, a doctrine designed to correct “drafting errors” is perfectly permissible
under this variant of textualism.245 Textualists merely are more reluctant than
intentionalists to conclude that a drafting error has occurred, Nelson claims,
and so they require more compelling evidence of such an error.246
This reluctance has two distinct sources, Nelson observes. First, textual-
ists are reluctant to correct “drafting errors” because textualists hope that
this judicial practice will incentivize members of Congress—or their
staffs—to review bills more closely.247 As such, Nelson’s claim is premised
upon a theory about why drafting errors might typically find their way into
statutes: because members of Congress and staffers might lack sufficient
motivation to closely review statutory text. As Part II explained, however,
members of Congress typically decline to perform pre-enactment review of
statutory text for a different reason: in a world of significant statutory com-
plexity, they lack the capacity to conduct this review. In such a situation,
increased incentives cannot prove effective, at least with respect to the mem-
bers themselves. Consequently, it might make particular sense for judges to
seek out and correct drafting errors in the staffer-delegation era, since the
countervailing interest in incentivizing members of Congress is absent in
such instances. This is precisely what the staffer-delegation doctrine encour-
ages them to do.
According to Nelson, textualists also are reluctant to acknowledge
drafting errors because textualists “worry about errors [by judges] in the
application of tests that require case-by-case exercises of judgment.”248 This
concern is relevant, Nelson explains, because any “drafting errors” doctrine
245 See Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 380 (2005) (“No less than
intentionalists . . . textualist judges acknowledge a concept of ‘drafting error’ that refers to the
actual intent of individual legislators.”).
246 See id. (“It is in the practical application of this concept that textualists and intentional-
ists really part company.”).
247 Id. at 382 (expressing the hope that “the courts’ reluctance to identify and correct
‘drafting errors’ may encourage members of Congress or their staffs to spend more time proof-
reading and poring over each individual bill”).
248 Id. Nelson further states:
The more one distrusts the ad hoc judgments that tests for drafting errors necessitate
. . . the more conservative one’s favored test will be. In particular, one might adopt
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is based on an intuitive calculation about the likelihood of false positives
(i.e., of judges finding errors where none exist) versus the likelihood of false
negatives (i.e., of judges overlooking genuine drafting errors).249 The con-
cern about case-by-case exercises of judgment is relevant because it alters
this equation for textualists, making textualists particularly hesitant to de-
clare a staffer error in any particular case.
Like other doctrines that seek to identify drafting errors, the staffer’s
error doctrine does require judges to perform “case-by-case exercises of
judgment.”250 However, an awareness of the staffer-delegation model of
lawmaking—and of members’ dependence upon this model—would presum-
ably alter the intuitive calculation described by Nelson (for both textualists
and non-textualists). In a world where members of Congress often are not
competent to review the work of the staffers who draft statutory text, the
risks of errors—and therefore of false negatives—presumably is heightened.
This would make any interpreter somewhat less reticent to conclude that a
drafting error has occurred—and therefore more likely to apply the staffer’s
error doctrine.
iii. Textualism as a Restriction on Source Materials. According to some
scholars, textualism’s central tenet is a prohibition on the use of secondary
materials—a prohibition that, for one reason or another, limits the interpreter
to the text of the relevant statute. John Manning, for example, has argued for
such a restriction on constitutional grounds. According to Manning, the
nondelegation doctrine imposes a constitutional mandate that judges not
stray beyond the text in statutory interpretation.251 Scalia defended this re-
striction on practical grounds, meanwhile, arguing that legislative history
“provides a uniquely broad playing field” for judges—one that, once al-
lowed in statutory interpretation, permits too much “variety and specificity
of result.”252
Due to this strain of textualism, several judges and scholars have sug-
gested that it is acceptable for courts to apply the scrivener’s error doctrine
any time the relevant error is evident to an interpreter based solely on the
text of the statute. Most notably, Scalia argued that the doctrine can legiti-
mately be applied to any situation in which: “[O]n the very face of the
statute it is clear to the reader that a mistake of expression (rather than of
the position advocated by modern textualists: judges should have leeway to identify
and correct ‘drafting errors’ only in what they consider to be very clear cases.
Id. at 381.
249 Id. at 381 (citing Frederick Schauer, The Practice and Problems of Plain Meaning: A
Response to Aleinikoff and Shaw, 45 VAND. L. REV. 715, 730 (1992)).
250 Id. at 382.
251 Manning, supra note 132, at 696–99. R
252 Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 36 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
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legislative wisdom) has been made.”253 Manning has contemplated such a
version of the scrivener’s error doctrine as well,254 as has Nelson.255
This version of textualism raises an interesting question: can a version
of the staffer’s error doctrine be created that relies solely upon statutory text?
It is difficult to know. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the Court relied
surprisingly heavily on statutory text—and surprisingly little on secondary
materials—in its reconstruction of statutory purpose in King v. Burwell.
Here, the Court relied upon findings within the statute for statements of stat-
utory purpose, and it viewed these statements in conjunction with the stat-
ute’s various provisions in order to develop a bird’s eye view of how these
provisions were meant to operate in service of the statute’s larger goals.256 In
this sense, the Court’s efforts in King v. Burwell paint an intriguing picture
which suggests that a text-based version of the staffer’s error doctrine—a
version that potentially would appease source-focused textualists—might be
possible.
iv. Textualism as a Rejection of Intent-Based Interpretation. According
to the most natural interpretation of the staffer’s error doctrine, this doctrine
is designed to discover and enforce the intentions of Congress. Nonetheless,
it also is possible to justify this doctrine without any recourse to notions of
congressional intent. Such a justification may be particularly appealing to
textualists, since many textualists reject the notion that congressional intent
is the proper object of statutory interpretation.
According to this justification, the staffer’s error doctrine does indeed
rest upon the division-of-labor theory discussed in Section A of this Part.
This doctrine, it confirms, is designed to induce courts to review the work of
unelected staffers—in particular, to ensure that these staffers did not insert
errors into statutory text. However, the work of unelected staffers does not
receive additional review simply because it poses an inherent threat to the
proper encoding of congressional intent, it argues. Instead, staffer work re-
ceives this added review because it makes sense, for some additional reason,
to treat the work of unelected staffers differently from the work of elected
representatives.
For example, one can imagine a situation in which courts might want to
adopt textualist practices in order to incentivize members of Congress to
perform their legislative tasks precisely and responsibly. However, textual-
ists might simultaneously hope to refrain from incentivizing staffers, or from
incentivizing Congress to rearrange its internal divisions of labor. This reti-
253 Id. at 20.
254 Manning, supra note 206, at 2459–60 n.265 (“[W]hen an internal textual inconsis- R
tency or an obvious error of grammar, punctuation, or English usage is apparent from reading a
word or phrase in the context of the text as a whole, there is only the remotest possibility that
any such clerical mistake reflected a deliberate legislative compromise.”).
255 Nelson, supra note 245, at 356. R
256 See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2483 (2015) (“[T]he words of a statute must be
read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.”).
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cence might be grounded, for example, in a concern about courts meddling
with internal congressional practices and procedures. As such, this approach
might be conceptualized as a peculiar form of respect for Article I, Section 5
of the Constitution, which provides members with autonomy to determine
the internal rules, procedures, and practices of Congress.257
A similar theory could be offered that is based on retroactive accounta-
bility rather than forward-looking incentivizing. Under this view, elections
are designed not only to provide accountability for legislators who have ad-
vanced policies that are contrary to the public will; rather, they also are
designed to allow for the removal of legislators who are incompetent or inef-
fective. It is a view which assumes that elections are meant to hold repre-
sentatives accountable for the process as well as the substance of their
legislative work. When judges intervene to save legislators from their own
errors, this theory would assert, they are undermining the proper operation of
this constitutional mechanism. In effect, they are propping up incompetent
legislators—individuals who should be allowed the opportunity to show that
they can produce effective legislation, or who otherwise should be subject to
judgment on that account at the ballot box.
Even if one accepts the idea that members of Congress should be held
accountable for their own errors, however, it is not clear that they should
equally be held accountable for the errors of their agents. This is particularly
true in a period when the delegation of some lawmaking tasks is unavoida-
ble, as it is today—and especially when many of these delegations are to
career staffers whose employment cannot be terminated by an individual
member of Congress. In this world—a world in which members of Congress
inevitably are dependent upon some experts for the execution of their legis-
lative vision—forcing members to stand judgment for staffer errors no
longer seems to serve any accountability function. Instead, it seems to
achieve quite the opposite: it takes any member who competently relies upon
existing congressional delegation practices, and it renders that member ran-
domly subject to the possibility of being undermined by forces largely
outside the member’s control.
In short, there are many reasons why courts might uniquely concern
themselves with correcting errors by unelected staffers. While the most obvi-
ous reasons relate to the preservation of congressional intent, not all of these
reasons are necessarily connected to an intentionalist agenda—and textual-
ists should consider these alternative justifications before summarily dis-
missing the staffer’s error doctrine.
V. CONCLUSION: A NEW (YET OLD) THEORY OF CONGRESS
By outlining and defending a new “staffer’s error doctrine,” this Article
has developed an argument that has implications for the practice of statutory
257
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
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interpretation. At the same time, this argument also has theoretical implica-
tions for the field of legislation—one of which is particularly worth high-
lighting here. Namely, this argument reveals the inadequacy of the theories
of Congress espoused by textualists and purposivists—and it points toward
an alternative theory that ought to have a more prominent place in the field
of legislation.
First, consider the theory of Congress found in purposivist scholarship.
This scholarship typically argues that Congress is, above all, a purpose-
driven institution. According to many purposivists, this characteristic is a
result of the task that Congress must perform. The very nature of legislation,
these scholars argue, is to realize broad social goals or objectives. This view
is typified by the famous statement by Hart and Sacks that: “Law is a doing
of something, a purposive activity, a continuous striving to solve the basic
problems of social living.”258 Based on this theory about the nature of law-
making, purposivists frequently assume that Congress, as a lawmaking insti-
tution, must itself be purpose-driven. Hart and Sacks argued, for example,
that courts could accurately assume “that the legislature was made up of
reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably.”259
By contrast, many textualists hold that Congress should be viewed in-
stead as a deal-making institution. As one textbook has put it: “[Many textu-
alists adopt] a view of the legislative process that is different—and
grittier—than the one that underlies strong purposivism. Rather than seeing
the legislative process as coherent and reasonable, the new textualists em-
phasize the rough-and-tumble of political compromise.”260
In distinction to these two theories, this Article has argued that a third
theory of Congress is relevant to the field of statutory interpretation: namely,
the theory embedded for many decades in the parallel field of administrative
law. In administrative law, a defining feature of the modern Congress is
assumed to be its delegation of lawmaking tasks to agents (namely, to execu-
tive branch agents). Due to fundamental changes that Congress underwent in
the late twentieth century, this Article has argued, delegation to unelected
agents has become a similarly defining feature of lawmaking within Con-
gress. Consequently, modern federal lawmaking is invariably marked by del-
egation, regardless of whether it is outsourced to agencies or conducted
within Congress.
Based on this observation, the foregoing pages have argued that courts
should be reviewing these two types of lawmaking similarly. In each in-
stance, courts should be ensuring that agents of Congress did not exceed the
scope of their delegations. In this way, this article has argued that this alter-
258
HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 148 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
Foundation Press 1994) (1958).
259 Id. at 1378.
260
JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 54
(2d ed. 2013).
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native theory of Congress leads to a narrow but rigid brand of purposivism.
It is a version whereby courts are not necessarily empowered to fill every
gap and ambiguity in a statute with their understandings of statutory pur-
pose, but where courts are empowered to ensure that no statutory text—no
matter how unambiguous—is allowed to undermine the core purposes of the
statute.
Not all will agree that courts’ review of statutory text should more
closely resemble their review of agency rulemaking, of course. The review
of staffer drafting is, after all, a review of activity conducted prior to mem-
bers of Congress voting upon a bill—a quality that distinguishes this activity
from agency rulemaking. As such, some commentators will conclude that
the proper form of review for errors made within the former process is a pre-
enactment review by members of Congress, not a post-enactment review by
the courts.
However, the staffer’s error doctrine is based upon the idea that, in an
era in which members of Congress are not competent to provide pre-enact-
ment review of statutory text, this distinction between pre-vote and post-vote
lawmaking is somewhat hollow.261 In each instance, members of Congress
are vulnerable to the threat of having their lawmaking agents undermine the
decisions that they have made during the enactment process. Under the
staffer’s error doctrine, these comparable threats are met with comparable
protections. As the foregoing pages have explained, they are protections that
courts have long understood themselves as empowered to provide—and that
make particular sense in an era marked by the staffer-delegation model of
lawmaking.
261 This claim resembles Judge Posner’s assertion in Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. v.
United States, 37 F.3d 321 (7th Cir. 1994), that: “[I]n the case of statutory language [that is]
technical and arcane . . . the slogan that Congress votes on the bill . . . strikes us as pretty
empty.” Id. at 324.
